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NOTE
TRIGGERING COVERAGE OF PROGRESSIVE PROPERTY
LOSS: PRESERVING THE DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN
FIRST- AND THIRD-PARTY INSURANCE POLICIES
For years, courts have differed on the proper way to interpret
and apply standardized insurance provisions to the complicated
and increasingly litigated phenomenon of continuous and pro-
gressive property damage.' These complex actions involve prop-
erty damage which progressively worsens over an extended
period of time but which is not readily discoverable by the in-
jured party until late in the deterioration process when the dam-
age "manifests."2 Delayed manifestation property loss often re-
sults in both first-3 and third-party4 insurance claims arising in
1. The problem of continuous loss is not confined to property damage. A very
thorough body of continuous loss law has also developed to handle bodily injury
claims such as asbestosis and silicosis. See, e.g., Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N.
Am., 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982) (holding that
coverage was triggered by inhalation exposure to asbestos, exposure while disease
developed, and manifestation of disease); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight
Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1980) (holding each insurer that issued
policies during period of exposure to asbestos liable for its pro rata share), clarified
on reh'g, 657 F.2d 814 (6th Cir. 1981); Telectromcs, Inc. v. United Natl Ins. Co.,
796 F. Supp. 1382 (D. Colo. 1992) (holding that all product liability policies in effect
throughout the course of injury from a defective heart pacemaker were required to
share defense costs); J.H. France Refractories Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 626 A.2d 502
(Pa. 1993) (applying multiple trigger to asbestosis claims).
2. Courts generally agree that a damage is "manifest" at that point in time at
which "appreciable damage occurs so that a reasonable insured would be on notice of
a potentially insured loss." Prudential-LMI Commercial Ins. v. Superior Court, 798
P.2d 1230, 1237 (Cal. 1990).
3. First-party insurance policies are designed to indemnify the insured for direct
losses resulting from a covered peril. Under such a policy, the insurer will compen-
sate the insured for all covered losses up to the specified policy limit. 1 GEORGE J.
COUCH, COUCH CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 1:61 (2d ed. 1984); see also infra
notes 38-46 and accompanying text (discussing relevant first-party policy provisions).
4. Third-party insurance is most commonly found in the form of Comprehensive
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connection with construction defects,' environmental contamina-
tion,6 soil subsidence damage,7 and product liability losses.'
When an insured has been covered by multiple policy writers
throughout the period of loss, parties frequently resort to the
courts to determine which policy or policies must indemnify the
insured.
General Liability policies. These "CGL" policies are designed to defend and indemnify
the insured in liability actions brought against him by a third party. Similar to
first-party insurance, discussed supra note 3 and infra notes 38-46, the CGL policy
is designed to cover all liability actions except those specifically excluded. 1 WARREN
FREEDMAN, FREEDMAN'S RICHARDS ON INSURANCE § 4:7 (6th ed. 1990); see also infra
notes 47-53 and accompanying text (discussing relevant third-party policy provisions).
5. See, e.g., Stonewall Ins. Co. v. City of Palos Verdes Estates, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d
663 (Ct. App.), review granted, 834 P.2d 1147 (Cal. 1992); Pines of La Jolla Home-
owners Ass'n v. Industrial Indem., 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 53 (Ct. App. 1992); Great
Southwest Fire Ins. Co. v. Watt Indus., Inc., 280 Cal. Rptr. 249 (Ct. App. 1991);
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 273 Cal. Rptr. 431 (Ct. App.
1990); American Employer's Ins. Co. v. Pinkard Constr. Co., 806 P.2d 954 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1990); Gruol Constr. Co. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 524 P.2d 427 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1974).
6. See, e.g., Maryland Casualty Co. v. W.R. Grace & Co., No. 91-9322, 1993 WL
335115 (2d Cir. Sept. 1, 1993); Mraz v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 1325
(4th Cir. 1986); Dayton Indep. Sch. Dist. v. National Gypsum Co., 682 F. Supp. 1403
(E.D. Tex. 1988), rev'd and dismissed for lack of jurisdiction sub nom. W.R. Grace &
Co. v. Continental Casualty Co., 896 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1990); Montrose Chem. Corp.
v. Admiral Ins. Co., 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 358 (Ct. App. 1992), review granted, 862 P.2d
661 (Cal. May 21, 11992) (No. S026013); Garriott Crop Dusting Co. v. Superior
Court, 270 Cal. Rptr. 678 (Ct. App. 1990); Harford County v. Harford Mut. Ins. Co.,
610 A.2d 286 (Md. 1992); Industrial Steel Container Corp. v. Fireman's Fund Ins.
Co., 399 N.W.2d 156 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); Reliance Ins. Co. v. Armstrong World
Indus., Inc., 614 A.2d 642 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1992), modified, 625 A.2d 601
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1993). See generally Stephen D. Marcus, Fair Solutions for
the Future: The Environmental Claim and First Party Coverage, in ENVIRONMENTAL
COVERAGE 193 (1991) (examining first-party contamination and pollution claims).
7. Soil subsidence which is the result of natural forces generally, but not always,
is excluded under first-party insurance policies. Many of the claims which are liti-
gated as continuous loss involve some aspect of negligent construction, land compac-
tion, or drainage. See, e.g., Prudential-LMI Commercial Ins. v. Superior Court, 798
P.2d 1230 (Cal. 1990); Stonewall, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 663; Carty v. American States
Ins. Co., 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1 (Ct. App. 1992); Mara v. Fire Ins. Exch., 271 Cal. Rptr.
620 (Ct. App. 1990); Stanley v. Fire Ins. Exch., 274 Cal. Rptr. 157 (Ct. App. 1990).
8. See, e.g., Chemstar, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 797 F. Supp. 1541 (C.D. Cal.
1992); Dow Chem. Co. v. Associated Indem. Corp., 724 F. Supp. 474 (E.D. Mich.),
supplemented, 727 F. Supp. 1524 (E.D. Mich. 1989); United States Fidelity & Guar-
anty Co. v. American Ins. Co., 345 N.E.2d 267 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976).
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As successful environmental contamination, asbestos-related
property damage, and construction defect claims generate larger
and larger recoveries, problems of allocating indemnity responsi-
bility among successive insurers increasingly will become a pri-
mary focus of continuous loss litigation.' In response to the dif-
ficult factual, legal, and public policy questions presented in
these types of dilemmas, courts have developed several "trigger
of coverage" theories to determine which insurers are liable for
the loss. These trigger theories are outgrowths of the interpreta-
tion of terms and phrases utilized in the disputed first- or third-
party policy, such as "occurrence," "inception of the loss," and
"property damage."'0 In adopting a particular coverage trigger,
courts frequently struggle to define these broad trigger terms by
reference to the reasonable expectations of the insured," the
intentions of the insurer,12 public policy concerns," and other
continuing loss precedent. 4
9. Recently, a jury ordered an insurance company to pay $2.8 million in compen-
satory damages and $14 million in punitive damages for their refusal to provide cov-
erage for plaster pitting claims against the insured in Chemstar, Inc. v. Liberty Mu-
tual Insurance Co., 797 F. Supp. 1541 (C.D. Cal. 1992). See 1992 Largest Verdicts,
NAVL L.J., Jan. 25, 1993, at S8, S8-S9. For a discussion of the case, see infra notes
109-16. See also Maryland Casualty, 1993 WL 335115, at *1 ("As of May 31, 1989,
17,411 individual lawsuits had been filed against [the asbestos insurer] for personal
injuries ... and building owners had filed another 212 lawsuits for property dam-
age ... ."), petition for reh'g filed, id.; Lac d'Amiante du Que., Ltee. v. American
Home Assurance Co., 613 F. Supp. 1549 (D.N.J. 1985) (involving an insured facing
over 4500 asbestos bodily injury claims involving $4.5 million in settlement liabilities
and $11 million in defense costs plus property damage claims); John P. Arness &
Randall D. Eliason, Insurance Coverage for "Property Damage" in Asbestos and Other
Toxic Tort Cases, 72 VA. L. REV. 943, 943 (1986) (noting that total asbestos liability
projections from 1980 to 2015 range from $7.6 billion to $87.1 billion).
10. See, e.g., Maryland Casualty, 1993 WL 335115, at *7 ("[The meaning of the
word occurrence is important because how that word is defined will determine what
event will trigger the insurers' obligation . . . ."); infra notes 38-53 (discussing and
defining the relevant terms in first- and third-party insurance policies).
11. See infra notes 177-97 and accompanying text (discussing the influence of the
reasonable expectations doctrine).
12. See infra notes 194-97 and 244-56 accompanying text (discussing the role of
industry expectations in continuous loss).
13. See infra notes 235-72 and accompanying text (discussing the role of public
policy concerns in triggering coverage).
14. See, e.g., Chemstar, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 797 F. Supp. 1541, 1549-50
(C.D. Cal. 1992); Prudential-LMI Commercial Ins. v. Superior Court, 798 P.2d 1230,
1243-46 (Cal. 1990).
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Two dominant trends in triggering coverage and apportioning
responsibility between successive insurers have developed within
the courts. A longstanding approach has been to hold that an
insurer on the risk during some period of exposure to the injury
causing agent or its damage is responsible for indemnifying the
insured. Several variations of this "injury-oriented" approach
have been applied to determine exactly which of the insurers
throughout the deterioration period should be accountable. 5 In
contrast, the second general approach holds that the insurer on
the risk at the manifestation of the damage is responsible for
the entire loss. 6
Within these two general categories of trigger theories, a mul-
titude of more specific rules have been developed and applied'7
in cases involving continuous loss:
(1) The Exposure Rule: coverage is only triggered when the
property is first exposed to the injury-causing agent."
(2) The Manifestation Trigger: coverage is triggered when the
damage is discovered, or should have been discovered, by the
injured party. 9
15. See infra notes 120-36 and notes 137-50 and accompanying text (discussing the
continuous and injury-in-fact triggers).
16. See, e.g., Prudential, 798 P.2d 1230; see also infra note 19 (citing cases adopt-
ing the manifestation trigger of coverage).
17. See, e.g., South Carolina Ins. Co. v. Coody, 813 F. Supp. 1570, 1576 (M.D. Ga.
1993) (listing several judicial approaches to toxic substance exposure); Industrial
Steel Container Corp. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 399 N.W.2d 156, 159 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1987) (listing several judicial approaches to continuous injury). At least five
triggers of coverage have been utilized by courts confronting continuous loss issues
in the bodily injury and property damage contexts. The manifestation, exposure, and
continuous triggers, however, are the most frequently encountered triggers. See
BARRY R. OSTRAGER & THOMAS R. NEWMAN, HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE COVERAGE
DIsPUTES § 9.03 (6th ed. 1993) (discussing the exposure, manifestation, triple or
continuous, double, and injury-in-fact triggers).
18. See, e.g., Continental Ins. Cos. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co.,
842 F.2d 977, 984 (8th Cir.) (stating in dicta that Missouri would probably adopt the
exposure rule for environmental contamination), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 821 (1988);
Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212, 1216-17 (6th
Cir. 1980) (comparing manifestaion theory and exposure theory), clarified on reh'g,
657 F.2d 814 (6th Cir. 1981).
19. See, e.g., Chemstar, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 797 F. Supp. 1541, 1551
(C.D. Cal. 1992) (applying manifestation trigger to construction defects); Maryland
Casualty Co. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 794 F. Supp. 1206, 1224-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (envi-
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(3) The Double Trigger: coverage is triggered when the prop-
erty is first exposed to the injury-causing agent and at the
time the damage becomes manifest to the injured party.
(4) The Triple or "Continuous" Trigger: coverage is triggered
at first exposure to the injury-causing agent, at the manifes-
tation of damage, and at all points in between."
(5) The Injury-in-Fact Rule: coverage is triggered only at
those points actual injury occurred, regardless of whether the
damage has become manifest."
ronmental damage), rev'd, No. 91-9322, 1993 WL 335115 (2d Cir. Sept. 1, 1993);
Prudential, 798 P.2d at 1246 (soil subsidence); Carty v. American States Ins. Co., 9
Cal. Rptr. 2d 1 (Ct. App. 1992) (soil subsidence); Pines of La Jolla Homeowners
Ass'n v. Industrial Indem., 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 53, 57 (Ct. App. 1992) (construction de-
fects); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 273 Cal. Rptr. 431,
434 (Ct. App. 1990) (construction defects); Home Ins. Co. v. Landmark Ins. Co., 253
Cal. Rptr. 277 (Ct. App. 1988) (construction defects); Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Safeco
Ins. Co. of N. Am., 472 N.W.2d 5, 7 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991) (products liability); Jack-
son v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 835 P.2d 786 (Nev. 1992) (soil subsidence);
Gruol Constr. Co. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 524 P.2d 427, 430 (Wash. Ct. App.
1974) (construction defects).
20. This trigger is also referred to as the "multiple trigger." J.H. France
Refractories Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 626 A.2d 502, 506 (Pa. 1993); see also Dayton
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. National Gypsum Co., 682 F. Supp. 1403 (E.D. Tex. 1988) (as-
bestos-related property damage), rev'd and dismissed for lack of jurisdiction sub nom.
W.R. Grace & Co. v. Continental Casualty Co., 896 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1990); Lac
d'Amiante du Que., Ltee. v. American Home Assurance Co., 613 F. Supp. 1549
(D.N.J. 1985) (asbestos-related property damage); Stonewall Ins. Co. v. City of Palos
Verdes Estates, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 663 (Ct. App.) (property damage claim), review
granted, 834 P.2d 1147 (Cal. Aug. 27, 1992); Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Admiral Ins.
Co., 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 358 (Ct. App.) (applying continuous trigger to hazardous waste
contamination claim), review granted, 862 P.2d 661 (Cal. 1992); Great Southwest Fire
Ins. Co. v. Watt Indus., Inc., 280 Cal. Rptr. 249 (Ct. App. 1991) (damage caused by
faulty roof); American Employer's Ins. Co. v. Pinkard Constr. Co., 806 P.2d 954
(Colo. Ct. App. 1990) (damage caused by roof collapse), appeal dismissed per stipula-
tion, 831 P.2d 887 (Colo. 1991); Harford County v. Harford Mut. Ins. Co., 610 A.2d
286 (Md. 1992) (environmental contamination claim); Reliance Ins. Co. v. Armstrong
World Indus., Inc., 614 A.2d 642 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1992) (contaminants dis-
charge claim), modified, 625 A.2d 601 (N.J. Super Ct. Law Div. 1993); Gottlieb v.
Newark Ins. Co., 570 A.2d 443 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990) (environmental con-
tamination claim); Gruol, 524 P.2d 427 (negligent construction claim).
21. See, e.g., Maryland Casualty, 1993 WL 335115 (adopting damage-in-fact trigger
for third-party asbestos-related property damage); W.R. Grace & Co. v. Continental
Casualty Co., 896 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1990) (stating that the injury-in-fact trigger
would be applicable to asbestos-related property damage under New York law), rev'g
Dayton Indep. Sch. Dist. v National Gypsum Co., 682 F. Supp. 1403 (E.D. Tex.
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The body of case law from which these theories have emerged is
a morass of difficult to reconcile, inapposite opinions that have
juxtaposed first- and third-party insurance precedent and exac-
erbated problems in a burgeoning area of litigation.22
Fortunately, a prominent decision by the California Supreme
Court in Prudential-LMI Commercial Insurance v. Superior
Court' settled much of the uncertainty surrounding trigger of
coverage issues in first-party progressive property loss situa-
tions. Influenced by public policy and the insured's reasonable
expectations of coverage,24 the court in Prudential adopted the
manifestation trigger of coverage after an extensive review of
previous holdings. The Prudential decision, however, did not
attempt a reconciliation of the variety of coverage triggers adopt-
ed in the context of third-party insurance policies.26 As a result,
third-party continuous loss case law remains unsettled as courts
with differing goals and perceptions continue to reach divergent
results.27
1988); Dow Chem. Co. v. Associated Indem. Corp., 724 F. Supp. 474 (E.D. Mich.)
(applying injury-in-fact trigger to product-related progressive property damage), sup-
plemented, 727 F. Supp. 1524 (E.D. Mich. 1989); Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Liber-
ty Mut. Ins. Co., 703 F. Supp. 367 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (adopting injury-in-fact trigger for
liability policy); United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 653 F. Supp. 152, 197
(W.D. Mo. 1986) (favoring the "damage-in-fact" trigger); Sandoz, Inc. v. Employer's
Liab. Assurance Corp., 554 F. Supp. 257 (D.N.J. 1983) (adopting the damage-in-fact
trigger for bodily injury); Industrial Steel Container Corp. v. Fireman's Fund Ins.
Co., 399 N.W.2d 156 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (adopting "actual injury" trigger for
groundwater contamination); Keystone Automated Equip. Co. v. Reliance Ins. Co.,
535 A.2d 648 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (adopting injury-in-fact trigger for liability policy
application).
22. See, e.g., Lac d'Amiante, 613 F. Supp. at 1551 (noting conflicting decisions and
perplexing issues); Montrose, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 363 (citing judicial inconsistency);
Gottlieb, 570 A.2d 445 (noting a "plethora" of cases); see also supra note 9 (comment-
ing on the soaring costs of continuous loss litigation).
23. 798 P.2d 1230 (Cal. 1990).
24. Under the reasonable expectations doctrine, courts which find insurance policy
language ambiguous will interpret the terms consistent with the "reasonable expecta-
tions" of the insured. See infra notes 180-90 (discussing the application of the doc-
trine in continuous loss cases).
25. Prudential, 798 P.2d at 1242-48; see also infra notes 91-108 and accompanying
text (discussing the Prudential decision).
26. "Accordingly, and because the issue of whether an allocation or exposure theo-
ry should apply in the third party property damage liability context is not before
the court, we leave its resolution to another date." Prudential, 798 P.2d at 1246.
27. Compare Pines of La Jolla Homeowners Ass'n v. Industrial Indem., 7 Cal.
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In an apparent attempt to introduce a greater degree of uni-
formity in continuous loss holdings, some courts recently have
elected to follow the California Supreme Court's lead in Pruden-
tial by adopting the manifestation trigger in third-party situa-
tions as well." This development represents a departure from
many prior holdings which refused to apply the manifestation
trigger to third-party claims.29 Courts that hope to harmonize
progressive property loss holdings through the creation of a
blanket rule ignore the distinct contractual and circumstantial
differences between first and third-party policies."0 Other
courts, however, steadfastedly have insisted on maintaining a
bright-line distinction between policies rather than seeking a
uniform trigger rule."'
Rptr. 2d 53 (Ct. App. 1992) (applying the "manifestation" trigger to a construction
defect claim) with Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 358
(Ct. App.) (applying the "continuous injury" trigger to a construction defect claim),
review granted, 862 P.2d 661 (Cal. 1992); compare also Mraz v. Canadian Universal
Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 1325, 1328 (4th Cir. 1986) (applying the manifestation trigger to
environmental contamination claim) with Harford County v. Harford Mut. Ins. Co.,
610 A.2d 286, 294-95 (Md. 1992) (refusing to follow Mraz and concluding that cover-
age can be triggered at points earlier than manifestation).
28. See, e.g., Chemstar, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 797 F. Supp. 1541 (C.D. Cal.
1992) (applying manifestation trigger to product-related property damage under lia-
bility policies); Pines of La Jolla, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 53 (adopting manifestation trigger
for construction defect damage under occurrence based liability policy); Transamerica
Ins. Co. v. Safeco Ins. Co. of N. Am., 472 N.W.2d 5 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991) (holding
that manifestation of injury triggers coverage under comprehensive general liability
policy); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 273 Cal. Rptr. 431
(Ct. App. 1990) (applying manifestation trigger to third-party construction defect
claims); see also Mraz, 804 F.2d 1325 (applying manifestation trigger to environmen-
tal contamination claim under liability policy); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v.
American Ins. Co., 345 N.E.2d 267 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976) (applying manifestation trig-
ger to third-party claim for brick spalling damage).
29. See infra notes 120-36 (citing continuous trigger precedent) and supra notes
15-22 (discussing the divergent court holdings in third-party loss situations).
30. See, e.g., Great Southwest Fire Ins. Co. v. Watt Indus., Inc., 280 Cal. Rptr.
249, 257 (Ct. App. 1991) (Huffman, J., dissenting); Fireman's Fund, 273 Cal. Rptr. at
433.
31. See, e.g., Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 770 P.2d 704 (Cal. 1989)
(en banc) (holding that separate rules for concurrent causation analysis in first- and
third-party insurance disputes should be maintained); Chu v. Canadian Indem. Co.,
274 Cal. Rptr. 20, 25 (Ct. App. 1990) (distinguishing first- and third-party insurance
analysis); Montrose, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 363-64 (suggesting different interpretations
are necessary for different policies). One commentator has noted that:
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The whirlwind of issues that courts must reconcile when deal-
ing with progressive property damage claims simply cannot be
reduced to one basic trigger for any given loss situation. Though
the manifestation trigger may be appropriate for first-party pro-
gressive loss situations, as demonstrated in Prudential,2 dis-
tinct policy differences make injury-oriented triggers more appli-
cable to third-party claims.3 This Note will examine the many
issues surrounding continuous loss litigation and developments
since the Prudential decision. First, this Note analyzes the ex-
press contractual distinctions between first-party property and
third-party liability policies and the importance of those distinc-
tions to continuous loss litigation. Next, the various trigger of
coverage theories and representative case holdings in first- and
third-party disputes are addressed. After introducing the confu-
sion and divergence of opinion surrounding third-party holdings,
recent case law is analyzed to determine common themes and
motivations surrounding the application of the manifestation
and continuous triggers. Concurrently, this Note suggests that
rules appropriately developed for first-party continuous loss
disputes are not transferable to third-party liability claims. In
conclusion, this Note argues that the continuous trigger, which
holds responsible those insurers on the risk while damage oc-
curred, most clearly harmonizes the goals and provisions of
third-party comprehensive general liability policies.
THE CONTRACTUAL DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN FIRST- AND
THIRD-PARTY INSURANCE POLICIES
Because insurance is fundamentally a contract between two or
more parties, a court's determination of which trigger of cover-
"Environmental" subject matter should not be the signal to obliterate all
the previously discussed distinctions which we all accepted readily. To
abandon the distinctions of vocabulary, underlying policy purpose and
historic case law development between third-party liability and first-party
property coverage . . . involves a fundamental unfairness.
Marcus, supra note 6, at 219-20.
32. Prudential-LMI Commercial Ins. v. Superior Court, 798 P.2d 1230, 1242-48
(Cal. 1990).
33. See infra notes 117-19 and 265-72 accompanying text (discussing the ramifica-
tions of applying a manifestation trigger to third-party progressive loss scenarios).
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age theory should be applied generally is influenced by the type
of insurance policy at issue and its relevant provisions.4 Inter-
pretation of the insurance policy, however, is not an isolated
element of continuous loss litigation. The process of defining and
applying particular policy terms is highly influenced by public
policy considerations, the unique factual circumstances of the
case before a court, the parties to the litigation, and general
principles of insurance coverage. 5 How a court interprets, or
fails to interpret, certain key terms in a policy can dictate the
outcome of a case. Nevertheless, because the policy defines the
indemnity relationship between the insured and the insurer, it
should and must be the central focus of a court's analysis in any
coverage dispute.
Consequently, the terminology utilized in insurance policies is
pivotal in continuous loss litigation and courts must be cautious
when applying precedent based on different contractual lan-
guage. Frequently, courts have been guilty of indiscriminately
applying precedent established for one type of indemnity rela-
tionship to another.36 Recent decisions suggest that such over-
lap may be more common in the future as more courts adopt
first-party holdings and reasoning in the third-party context.3
Understanding the distinction in first- and third-party coverage
34. See, e.g., Chemstar, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 797 F. Supp. 1541, 1548-49
(C.D. Cal. 1992); Harford County v. Harford Mut. Ins. Co., 610 A.2d 286, 287 (Md.
1992); Great Southwest Fire Ins. Co. v. Watt Indus., Inc., 280 Cal. Rptr. 249, 253-56
(Ct. App. 1991).
35. See infra notes 151-272 and accompanying text (discussing various influences
on courts confronting continuous loss cases).
36. See, e.g., Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 358, 363
(Ct. App.) (finding a failure by courts to differentiate between first- and third-party
precedents and policy provisions), review granted, 862 P.2d 661 (Cal. 1992); Stanley
v. Fire Ins. Exch., 274 Cal. Rptr. 157 (Ct. App. 1990) (using liability policy defini-
tions to resolve first-party policy claim); Home Ins. Co. v. Landmark Ins. Co., 253
Cal. Rptr. 277 (Ct. App. 1988) (applying both first- and third-party continuous loss
precedent to resolve third-party claim).
37. E.g., Chemstar, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co, 797 F. Supp. 1541, 1548-51 (C.D.
Cal. 1992) (finding the Prudential decision "compelling"); Pines of La Jolla Homeown-
ers Ass'n v. Industrial Indem., 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 53, 57 (Ct. App. 1992) (citing to first-
party precedent and following Fireman's Fund); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Aetna
Casualty & Sur. Co., 273 Cal. Rptr. 431, 433 (Ct. App. 1990) (stating that first- and
third-party distinctions were not relevant to the case at bar).
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provisions is crucial to the development of a well-reasoned and
effective body of continuous loss case law.
First-Party Property Policies
First-party property insurance provisions are fairly standard-
ized. These policies cover the insured's interest in a particular
property and are primarily designed to directly indemnify for
loss or damage sustained by the insured.88 Typically, first-party
policies narrowly delineate the events and perils that are in-
sured risks." In general, most states require that insurers un-
derwriting named peril policies use the language contained in
the New York Standard Fire Policy of 1943.40
Unlike third-party insurance, first-party insurance policies
contain notice and suit limitation provisions that are quite spe-
cific:
Requirements in case loss occurs. The insured shall give im-
mediate written notice to this Company of any loss... and
within 60 days after the loss, unless such time is extended in
writing by this Company, the insured shall render to this
Company a proof of loss... stating the knowledge and belief
of the insured as to the following: the time and origin of the
loss .... 41
38. Chris M. Kallianos, Bad Faith Refusal to Pay First-Party Insurance Claims: A
Growing Recognition of Extra Contract Damages, 64 N.C. L. REV. 1421, 1421 n.3
(1986).
39. There are two main types of first-party property policies: "all-risk" and "named
perils." Homeowner's insurance is generally of the all-risk variety. It combines prop-
erty, casualty and personal liability coverage in a single policy package. These poli-
cies largely are based on the New York Standard Fire Insurance Policy of 1943.
EMMETr J. VAUGHAN & CURTIS M. ELLIOTr, FUNDAMENTALS OF RISK AND INSURANCE
355-56 (2d ed. 1978). Named peril policies insure only those losses specifically con-
templated and included within the policy. 1 COUCH, supra note 3, § 1:61.
40. 1943 New York Standard Fire Insurance Policy, in 3 FREEDMAN, supra note 4,
§ 17:3 [hereinafter Standard Fire Insurance Policy]. Attachments to the Standard
Policy tailor coverage to suit the needs of a particular insured. California, Florida,
Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Kansas, Maine, Missouri, New Mexico, North Dakota,
South Carolina, and Utah have all adopted the Standard Policy with insignificant
variations. Only Texas, Minnesota, and Massachusetts require the use of different
forms. VAUGHAN & ELLIOTr, supra note 39, at 355-56; see also Richard L. Antognini,
When Will My Troubles End? The Loss in Progress Defense in Progressive Loss Insur-
ance Cases, 25 LOY. LA. L. REV. 419, 425 (1992).
41. Standard Fire Insurance Policy, supra note 40, § 17.3 n.40 (second emphasis
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Suit. No suit or action on this policy for the recovery of any
claim shall be sustainable in any court of law or equity un-
less... commenced within twelve months next after inception
of the loss.42
These provisions indicate that coverage under a first-party policy
should be triggered at the "inception of the loss." s The policy
language also requires that there be some degree of "knowledge
and belief' on behalf of the insured as to the time and origin of
the loss when submitting a claim for indemnification." As a
result, to bring a claim under a first-party policy the insured
must have knowledge of the loss and a reasonable belief as to
the time and origin of the loss. In addition, the insured must be
prepared to bring suit on any coverage disputes regarding that
loss within twelve months of its inception.45 These provisions
and their corresponding limitations and public policy ramifica-
tions have encouraged many courts to apply the manifestation
trigger as the trigger that best harmonizes the policy inten-
tions.46 By doing so, the preclusive effect of an untimely claim
by the insured is minimized.
added).
42. Id. (emphasis added).
43. Id. The policy does not state expressly that coverage is triggered at the "in-
ception of the loss." Rather, coverage is triggered upon the happening of any insured
peril. In light of the suit limitations provision, however, courts have made a policy
decision to trigger coverage at the inception of the loss. See infra notes 91-108 and
accompanying text (discussing the Prudential decision) and infra notes 186-88 and
206-08 and accompanying text (discussing public policy ramifications of first-party
policies).
44. Standard Fire Insurance Policy, supra note 40, § 17.3 n.40; see supra text
accompanying note 41.
45. See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 2071 (Deering 1992) (requiring suit to be brought
within 12 months of "inception of the loss"). But see Port Arthur Towing Co. v. Mis-
sion Ins. Co., 623 F.2d 367, 368-69 (5th Cir. 1980) (invalidating under Texas law a
provision in an insurance policy requiring suit to be brought within 12 months).
46. See, e.g., Prudential-LMI Commercial Ins. v. Superior Court, 798 P.2d 1230,
1246 (Cal. 1990); Carty v. American States Ins. Co., 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1, 4-5 (Ct. App.
1992); Jackson v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 835 P.2d 786, 789-90 (Nev.
1992).
1994] 1811
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:1801
Third-Party Liability Policies
In the third-party context, the insured generally seeks indem-
nification and legal defense by the insurer from liability to a
third-party claimant rather than for a loss personally sustained.
Typically, the insurer assumes a duty to pay judgments result-
ing from an "occurence" within the policy period. The most fre-
quently encountered third-party insurance policy in continuous
loss litigation is the standardized Comprehensive General Lia-
bility policy, as revised in 1966 and 1973. 47
The relevant policy definitions in the 1966 version of the CGL
provide that:
"occurrence" means an accident, including injurious exposure
to conditions, which results, during the policy period, in...
property damage neither expected nor intended from the
point of the insured;
"property damage" means injury to or destruction of tangible
property."
Prior to 1966, coverage was triggered by "accidents" which oc-
curred during the policy period. Problems encountered with the
early policy, however, prompted changes in the 1966 version to
clarify that coverage was triggered by any "occurrence" resulting
in property damage rather than simply an "accident."49 Several
modifications were again made in 1973:
"occurrence" means an accident, including continuous or re-
peated exposure to conditions, which results in... property
damage neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of
the insured; ... ."
47. Arness & Eliason, supra note 9, at 946.
48. Id.
49. Under the 1966 policy version, courts tended to limit the meaning of "acci-
dent" to events which were sudden and identifiable. The language of the policy had
created confusion over the scope of the term "occurrence" and in determining when
an "accident" had occurred for coverage purposes. See Marcy L. Kahn, Looking for
"Bodily Injury: What Triggers Coverage Under a Standard Comprehensive General
Liability Insurance Policy?, in THE COMPREHENSIVE GENERAL LIABILITY POLICY: A
CRITIQUE OF SELECTED PROVISIONS 23, 24-28 (Arthur J. Liederman ed., 1985).
50. 3 FREEDMAN, supra note 4, at 467-68 (emphasis added).
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"property damage" means (1) physical injury to or destruction
of tangible property which occurs during the policy period,
including the loss of use thereof at any time resulting
therefrom, or (2) loss of use of tangible property which has
not been physically injured or destroyed provided such loss of
use is caused by an occurrence during the policy peri-
od;. ....
The most significant of these changes was the substitution of
"including continuous or repeated exposure" for "injurious expo-
sure to conditions" in the definition of "occurrence." This revision
did not change the substantive policy of providing coverage for
occurrences within the policy period but provided further guid-
ance and clarification.52 The clarification is important, however,
as it reflects industry awareness of the problems present in
coverage of continuous loss.5"
The Significance of the Distinctions to Continuous Loss
Unlike first-party policies, coverage in the third-party context
is triggered by "property damage" occurring during the policy
period rather than at the "inception of the loss." As a result, the
same fact pattern pursued under different policies could lead to
dramatically different results. A situation that reasonably could
be interpreted as "property damage" within the policy period of a
third-party policy may not qualify as the "inception of the loss"
under a first-party policy. For example, progressive corrosion
may be within the definition of "property damage," but it is diffi-
cult to pinpoint such damage as the "inception of loss." As com-
monly used, an "inception" would occur at either the commence-
ment or the ultimate manifestation of damage.'
51. Id. at 468 (emphasis added).
52. Kahn, supra note 49, at 26.
53. The limiting words "during the policy period" were also moved from the defini-
tion of occurrence to the definition of property damage. Arness & Eliason, supra
note 9, at 946. Courts do not seem to distinguish the revisions on this basis, how-
ever. The expansion of the property damage definition to include loss of use-has few
ramifications in situations of tangible physical damage such as progressive property
damage, although it is indicative of the expansive coverage contemplated by Compre-
hensive General Liability policies.
54. See infra notes 152-76 and accompanying text (discussing the interpretation of
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Another important difference between the two policies in-
volves the imposition of a strict suit limitation and notice provi-
sion in first-party insurance.55 This restriction has inspired
some courts to maximize an insured's recovery under first-party
policies by triggering coverage at a later date using the man-
ifestation trigger.56 Such a decision is largely driven by public
policy favoring coverage. In this way, damage is defined at the
latest possible moment and the preclusive effect of the suit limi-
tations provision is minimized.57 This policy incentive, however,
is absent in the third-party context.
First- and third-party insurance policies have substantively
distinct goals. Third-party coverage insures against liability to a
third party that has suffered loss as a result of the insured's
actions. In contrast, first-party policies seek to indemnify for
losses personally suffered by the insured. In general, a first-
party insured is able to predict his maximum losses and poten-
tial risks during a particular policy period. An insured protected
by a liability policy, however, can at best make an educated
guess as to potential losses and risks.58 Whereas direct damage
losses can never exceed the value of the insured property, liabili-
ty claims can be virtually unlimited.59 As a result, the spectrum
of risks and degree of uncertainty is much greater in the context
of third-party insurance coverage.
As a result of these contractual differences and policy consid-
erations, courts historically have drawn more distinctions than
parallels between the two types of insurance. The California
Supreme Court's reasoning in Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Ca-
policy terms and its ramifications). For example, the progressive deterioration of a
negligently constructed roof could be labeled an 'occurence" at any point in the dete-
rioration process. In contrast, "inception of the loss" contemplates a starting
point-either the commencement of damage (presumably the roofs construction or
initial deterioration) or the first discovery of damage (manifestation).
55. See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text (quoting the relevant policy pro-
visions).
56. See, e.g., Prudential-LMI Commercial Ins. v. Superior Court, 798 P.2d 1230
(Cal. 1990).
57. See infra notes 235-72 and accompanying text (discussing public policy).
58. See, e.g., Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 358, 366
(Ct. App.), review granted, 862 P.2d 661 (Cal. 1992).
59. SOLOMON S. HUEBNER ET AL., PROPERTY & LIAPITY INSURANCE 414 (2d ed.
1976).
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sualty Company"0 most notably exemplifies the judicial tenden-
cy to distinguish first- and third-party policy analysis. In
Garvey, the court confronted the difficult issue of determining
coverage in concurrent causation cases where one cause is a cov-
ered peril and the other is expressly excluded by the policy pro-
visions." The court found that the operation of exclusionary
provisions and the analysis of causation were different under
first- and third-party policies because "the 'cause' of loss in the
context of a property insurance contract is totally different from
that in a liability policy." 2 The court emphasized that third-
party coverage analysis involved traditional tort concepts of fault
and proximate cause and the insured's corresponding liability."3
In contrast, first-party coverage only required a determination
that the loss was caused by a covered peril. Consequently, the
court concluded that substantive policy differences required that
prior holdings in the third-party context be limited to such poli-
cies and that the distinct rule established for first-party concur-
rent causation coverage disputes be preserved."
60. 770 P.2d 704 (Cal. 1989); see also Chu v. Canadian Indemnity Co., 274 Cal.
Rptr. 201 (Ct. App. 1990). For a general discussion of the Garvey decision, see Otto
F. Becker et al., Concurrent Causation: Garvey v. State Farm and Where It Will
Lead, in TORT AND INSURANCE PRACTICE SECTION, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, PA-
PERS PRESENTED AT THE JOINT MEETING OF THE PROPERTY INSURANCE LAW COM-
MITTEE AND THE EXCESS, SURPLUS LINES, AND REINSURANCE COMMITTEE (1984).
61. Garvey, 770 P.2d at 706 (excluding losses caused or aggravated by earth move-
ment, but not losses resulting from contractor negligence).
62. Id. at 710 (quoting Michael E. Bragg, Concurrent Causation and the Art of
Policy Drafting: New Perils for Property Insurers, 20 FORUM 385, 386-87 (1985)).
The opinion of the court elaborated on this point:
For these reasons it is important to separate the causation analysis nec-
essary in a first-party property loss case from that which must be under-
taken in a third-party tort liability case. ... "[T]he 'cause' of loss in the
context of a property insurance contract is totally different from that in a
liability policy . .. ."
[T]he right to coverage in the third-party liability insurance context
draws on traditional tort concepts of fault, proximate cause and duty.
This liability analysis differs substantially from the coverage analysis in
the property insurance context, which draws on the relationship between
perils that are either covered or excluded in the contract.
Id. (quoting Michael E. Bragg, Concurrent Causation and the Art of Policy Drafting:
New Perils for Property Insurers, 20 FORUM 385, 386-87 (1985)).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 713 n.9. The court in Garvey found that the appellate court had mis-
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The majority's reasoning in Garvey is equally applicable to
continuous loss disputes. The underlying nature of the claims
and the right to coverage has implications for continuous loss is-
sues.6" Differences in policy terms and provisions should dictate
different analysis and outcomes for each.66 Superimposing case
law developed in one area onto another disregards these and
other differences and undermines the expectations of the
insured. 7
JUDICIAL INDIFFERENCE TO POLICY DISTINCTIONS
Courts that recently have attempted to establish a uniform
rule for triggering coverage under both first- and third-party
policies have minimized the Garvey holding and ignored contrac-
tual distinctions.68 Consequently, both first- and third-party
policy disputes have been evaluated similarly in some cases. Ig-
noring the distinct characteristics of each type of policy, howev-
er, compels inappropriate outcomes in third-party situations.
applied the third-party analysis of State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. v. Par-
tridge, 514 P.2d 123 (Cal. 1973), and that the first-party analysis of Sabella v.
Wisler, 37 P.2d 889 (Cal. 1963) should dictate the case's outcome. Garvey, 770 P.2d
at 705. Separate opinions in Garvey, however, argued that distinctions between first-
and third-party policies did not compel entirely different rules for determining causa-
tion coverage. The concurrence recognized several substantive differences between
property and liability policies, including the reasonable expectations of the insured
and third-party public policy considerations, but concluded they were not relevant to
the case at bar. Id. at 715 (Kaufman, J., concurring). Similarly, the dissent argued
that neither prior case law nor policy differences mandated different treatment for
first- and third-party concurrent causation litigation. Id. at 725 (Mosk, J., dissent-
ing).
65. See infra notes 68-85 and accompanying text (discussing the need to maintain
distinct rules for first and third party continuous loss cases) and infra notes 198-234
and accompanying text (discussing fortuity distinctions between the policies).
66. See infra notes 152-76 and accompanying text (discussing contractual interpre-
tation) and Marcus, supra note 6, at 223-28 (suggesting courts must not look to
liability precedent to resolve first-party issues).
67. See infra notes 277-97 and accompanying text (discussing public policy con-
cerns and the reasonable expectations of the insured).
68. See, e.g., Great Southwest Fire Ins. Co. v. Watt Indus., Inc., 280 Cal. Rptr.
249, 257 (Ct. App. 1991) (Huffinan, J., dissenting); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Aetna
Casualty & Sur. Co., 273 Cal. Rptr. 431, 433 (Ct. App. 1990).
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Since the decision in Prudential,69 many courts have adopted
first-party precedent to resolve third-party coverage disputes
and vice versa.70 As a result, the distinction between first- and
third-party property damage insurance is becoming increasingly
murky as courts interchange analytical frameworks and policy
rationales. Whereas this misapplication of precedent was more
indiscriminate previously,7' courts have begun to affirmatively
recognize the substantive differences between first- and third-
party policies, yet nevertheless advocate a blanket rule.72 For
example, courts which have recently adopted the manifestation
trigger in the third-party context find no, or limited, significant
legal distinctions between first- and third-party policies.7"
These courts suggest that any benefits from maintaining differ-
ent triggers for first- and third-party policies are outweighed by
public policy gains such as the creation of a bright line rule and
certainty in the insurance industry. 4 In Fireman's Fund Insur-
ance Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.," the court relied
heavily on a first-party continuous loss holding in Home Insur-
ance Co. v. Landmark Insurance Co.7" when interpreting a
69. Prudential-LMI Commercial Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 798 P.2d 1230 (Cal.
1990).
70. Chemstar, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 797 F. Supp. 1541 (C.D. Cal. 1992);
Stonewall Ins. Co. v. City of Palos Verdes Estates, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 663 (Ct. App.
1992), review granted, 834 P.2d 1147 (Cal. Aug. 27, 1992) (No. S027319); Fireman's
Fund Ins. Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 273 Cal. Rptr. 431 (Ct. App. 1990).
71. See, e.g., Stanley v. Fire Ins. Exch., 274 Cal. Rptr. 157 (Ct. App. 1990) (using
third-party liability provisions to resolve a first-party claim by the insured); Home
Ins. Co. v. Landmark Ins. Co., 253 Cal. Rptr. 277, 278 (Ct. App. 1988) (applying
liability policy provisions to first-party claim analysis).
72. See, e.g., Fireman's Fund, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 434.
73. "[D]istinguishing facts should not lead to a different result unless such facts
have legal significance .... There are several reasons why the distinction between
first- and third-party coverage is not legally significant. . . ." Id. at 433.
74. Chemstar, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 797 F. Supp. 1541, 1551 (C.D. Cal.
1992); Stonewall, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 673; U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. American Ins.
Co., 345 N.E.2d 267, 272 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976).
75. 273 Cal. Rptr. 431 (Ct. App. 1990).
76. 253 Cal. Rptr. 277 (Ct. App. 1988). Home involved an insured's claim against
two first-party insurers for continuous brick spalling damage. Id. at 279. One insurer
was on the risk during the spalling, and the other on the risk after the first mani-
festation of the damage. Id. The court applied the manifestation trigger, holding that
the insurer on the risk when the loss first visibly manifests itself must provide in-
demnity for the insured. Id. at 280. Similarly, Fireman's Fund involved a claim
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third-party liability policy. In emphasizing that any distinctions
between the policies were not legally significant, the court stated
that "no one would contend an automobile accident case involv-
ing a blue car should not be applied simply because the car now
at issue was green."7 The court in Fireman's Fund emphasized
Home's reliance on the third-party liability provisions rather
than the first-party property damage provisions of the disputed
policy to reach their decision, stating that they could discern no
meaningful difference between the terminology utilized.78 Un-
fortunately, two wrongs do not make a right. 9 Implicit in the
Fireman's Fund holding is the notion that contractual distinc-
tions between first- and third-party policies only should influ-
ence the court if overriding public policy considerations, such as
the compensation of an innocent third-party or indemnification
of the insured, exist.80
In contrast, other courts have drawn bright lines between
first- and third-party liability policies and suggest that the con-
fusion and uncertainty surrounding continuous loss litigation
against two insurers, one on the risk at discovery and a later one on the risk when
the cause of damage became known. Fireman's Fund, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 281. These
situations, involving post-manifestation liability, are slightly different then the prima-
ry cases discussed in this Note, which involve pre-manifestation insurer liability.
77. Fireman's Fund, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 433.
78. Id. In Home both the court and the parties relied on the definitions of "occur-
rence" and "property damage" found in the liability portion of the disputed policies,
rather than the first-party property damage provisions. Home, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 280.
In doing so, the court stated:
Courts frequently use the terms "loss" and "damage" interchangeably to
describe events that trigger coverage. A property insurer decides whether
there has been a "loss to property" during the policy period. Similarly,
the liability insurer determines if there has been an "occurrence...
resulting in property damage" while it was on the risk.
Id. at 278 n.2. As discussed throughout this Note, however, equating first- and
third-party triggers is inappropriate.
79. See infra notes 151-272 and accompanying text (discussing the need to avoid
indiscriminate application of precedent and the use of a blanket rule for first- and
third-party policies).
80. The court also noted that the statutory codification of the "loss-in-progress doc-
trine" which Home emphasized was also applicable in the third-party context.
Fireman's Fund, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 433-34. Given these important parallels, the court
in Fireman's Fund stated that the only relevant distinctions to be drawn between
holdings is whether the action involves allocation between insurers or a claim by the
insured against their insurer. Id. at 434.
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are a result of judicial failures to draw necessary distinctions.8
Courts with this view place great emphasis on the plain mean-
ing of the policy language, its reasonable contractual interpreta-
tion based on the insured's expectations of coverage,82 the re-
spective goals of each policy, and the specific context of impor-
tant terms within the policies.' In distinguishing third-party
from first-party policies, courts stress that third-party policies do
not contain twelve month suit limitation provisions.' As a re-
sult, third-party cases can be analyzed without considering the
preclusive effect that an insured's untimely suit might have on
recovery."
Similarly, courts distinguish the types of policies and the need
to avoid a uniform rule by presenting the distinct public policy
considerations which attach to third-party situations. The most
prominent of these considerations is the need to assure that
third parties are compensated for their losses.8" Whereas first-
party policies directly indemnify the insured, the principal bene-
ficiaries of liability policies tend to be innocent third persons
with no control over the insured or insurer. As a result, addi-
tional equity interests may need to be appraised in third-party
litigation.
81. One court stated the problem as follows:
Virtually uniform reliance on this [policy] language has not, unfortunate-
ly, resulted in consistent construction or application.
To begin with, some courts are oblivious to the distinction between first
and third party policies, -applying rules developed under the language of
one indiscriminately to the other.
Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 358, 363 (Ct. App.), re-
view granted, 862 P.2d 661 (Cal. 1992) (citation and footnote omitted).
82. See infra notes 146-225 and accompanying text (discussing contractual inter-
pretation and related concerns).
83. See infra notes 146-90 and accompanying text (discussing contractual interpre-
tation) and supra notes 51-63 and accompanying text (comparing relevant policy pro-
visions).
84. See, e.g., Montrose, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 367 ("There is no 'inception of the loss'
language in a standard CGL policy and no corollary need to apply the definition of
'loss' articulated in Prudential-LMI.").
85. See supra notes 41-44 and infra notes 206-08 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the limiting effect of the suit limitations provision).
86. See infra notes 226-60 and accompanying text (discussing public policy con-
siderations in the third-party context).
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The discord over the establishment of a bright line rule or
bright line distinction is a consuming element of continuous loss
litigation. Clearly, insurers and insureds alike benefit from the
creation of easily ascertained, concrete rules for applying trig-
gers of coverage. Nevertheless, the important differences and
attendant policy considerations between first- and third-party
policies demand that such rules be tailored to each policy rather
than indiscriminately and universally applied.
APPLICATION OF THE TRIGGER OF COVERAGE THEORIES 7
Despite contractual differences and distinct public policy con-
siderations, in litigation an insured party generally seeks a
broad and inclusive trigger of coverage in order to maximize his
compensation while insurers tend to advocate whichever theory
places the burden of indemnification in another insurer's policy
period. Obviously, the insured, the insurers, and any third par-
ties to the action have very significant interests in convincing
the court to adopt the trigger most beneficial to them. Conse-
quently, trigger theories have been developed by courts through
case-by-case analysis of particular equity considerations at issue
in each action. As a result, the trigger theories suffer from a
lack of consistency and systematic application.
The Manifestation Trigger
Application of the manifestation theory triggers insurance
coverage at the time the damage becomes known or should have
become known to the insured or interested third-party claim-
ant.88 Most often, manifestation corresponds with the insured's
or a third party's actual discovery of loss. Since its use by the
California Supreme Court in Prudential,9 this trigger has seen
87. See, e.g., OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 17, § 9.03; Barry S. Levin &
William J. Gorham, III, Important Issues in Occurrence Policies, in INSURANCE,
EXCESS, AND REINSURANCE COVERAGE DISPUTES 1991, at 9 (Barry R. Ostrager &
Thomas R. Newman eds., PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No.
405, 1991). Only the manifestation, continuous, and injury-in-fact triggers will be dis-
cussed in detail in this Note.
88. Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 358, 364-65 (Ct.
App.), review granted, 862 P.2d 661 (Cal. 1992).
89. Prudential-LMI Commercial Ins. v. Superior Court, 798 P.2d 1230, 1246 (Cal.
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aggressive application in both first- and third-party loss situa-
tions."0
In Prudential, the California Supreme Court reviewed a histo-
ry of conflicting judicial opinions to establish the manifestation
theory as the appropriate trigger of coverage for first-party pro-
gressive loss situations.9' Appellant Prudential was one of four
successive insurers on the risk for the insureds' apartment com-
plex during and after its construction in 1970.92 In November of
1985, after Prudential's coverage period, the insureds discovered
a crack in the foundation of the complex and promptly filed a
claim for coverage in December of 1985."3 More than a year and
a half later, but prior to Prudential's denial of coverage, the
insureds filed suit against Prudential and the other insurers of
the complex.94 In response, Prudential moved for summary
judgment, contending that there was no evidence any loss was
suffered during its policy period and that the one year suit limi-
tation provision barred the insureds' claim.95 The insureds ar-
gued that they were excused from compliance with the limita-
tions provision as the loss could not have been reasonably dis-
covered within the policy period. Thus, they argued, the "incep-
tion of the loss" had not yet taken place."
Prudential's summary judgment motion was denied by the
trial court97 and both parties subsequently appealed to the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court.9 s After review, the supreme court held
that the inception of the loss "should be determined by reference
to reasonable discovery of the loss and not necessarily turn on
the occurrence of the physical event causing the loss."99 The
1990).
90. See supra note 19 (citing manifestation holdings).
91. Id. at 1246. For an analysis of important precedents prior to Prudential, see
Michael J. Brady et al., Insurance Coverage Concerns in California Continuous Prop-
erty Loss Cases After Prudential-LMI, 31 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 851 (1991).
92. Prudential, 798 P.2d at 1233.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1233-34.
95. Id. at 1234.
96. Id. at 1236-38.
97. Id. at 1234.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1238.
19941 1821
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:1801
court defined the "inception of the loss" as that point in time
when appreciable damage occurs and is, or should be, known to
the insured such that a reasonable person would realize that his
duty to notify the insurer had been triggered.' 0 Consequently,
the court held that in a first-party property damage case, the
carrier on the risk when damage manifests is solely responsible
for indemnification if the loss is a covered peril under the poli-
cy.'0 ' Prior to the manifestation of damage to the insured, the
loss was still an insurable contingency. Once discovered, the risk
was no longer contingent and the duty to indemnify was trig-
gered.0 2 Injury-oriented triggers, the court found, were only
appropriate when damages slowly accumulate, as in bodily inju-
ry cases.' 3
In adopting the manifestation rule, the court hoped to pro-
mote the interests of both the insurer and the insured by pro-
moting certainty in the insurance industry.' 4 In addition, the
court determined that the manifestation rule corresponded with
the "loss-in-progress" doctrine in that insurers who held policies
after manifestation to the insured would not be held liable."5
The court also noted that the insured's reasonable expectations
of coverage under the policy in effect at the time of the loss'
discovery were adequately met.0 6 Limiting its holding to first-
party progressive loss cases, the court cited to Garvey'°7 and
the substantial analytical differences between first-party prop-
erty and third-party liability policies.0 8
In spite of the court's attempt to limit its manifestation hold-
ing to first-party loss situations, some courts recently have ap-
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1246.
102. Id.
103. "[I]n first party cases applying the rule finding coverage only on actual occur-
rence of injury, no damage or injury of any kind has taken place until manifesta-
tion; the cause instead lies dormant until it later causes appreciable injury." Id.
104. Id. at 1247.
105. The "loss-in-progress" doctrine is used by courts to ascertain that only risks,
and not certainties, are insured. See infra notes 198-205 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing fortuity and the 'loss-in-progress" doctrine in continuous loss cases).
106. Prudential, 798 P.2d at 1247.
107. Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 770 P.2d 704 (Cal. 1989).
108. Prudential, 798 P.2d at 1245 n.8.
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plied the manifestation rule to third-party claims under Compre-
hensive General Liability policies as well.'19 This crossover ap-
plication of the manifestation rule is well demonstrated in the
recent case of Chemstar, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance
Co."0 Chemstar involved twenty-eight liability claims against
the insured for property damage resulting from negligently man-
ufactured plaster which was unsuitable for interior use."' Af-
ter installation, the plaster pitted and created an unsightly wall
surface in the claimants' homes."' After review, the court em-
braced Prudential's finding that trigger rules that focus on expo-
sure to damage causing conditions are only useful in limited
circumstances, such as bodily harm caused by asbestos."'
Here, the court reasoned, damage only occurred in some homes
despite the presence of tainted plaster in many others." In
addition, because damage was only cosmetic, it did not occur
until pitting manifested, regardless of the progressive deteriora-
tion that occured prior to discovery."5 Ultimately, the court
held that, based on the reasoning and policy of Prudential, the
109. See, e.g., Chemstar, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co, 797 F. Supp. 1541 (C.D.
Cal. 1992); Pines of La Jolla Homeowners Ass'n v. Industrial Indem., 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d
53 (Ct. App. 1992); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 273 Cal.
Rptr. 431 (Ct. App. 1990); Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Safeco Ins. Co. of N. Am., 472
N.W.2d 5 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991).
110. 797 F. Supp. 1541 (C.D. Cal. 1992). The dispute in Chemstar centered on both
comprehensive general liability policies and public liability policies. Nevertheless, the
court found that all the policies were substantially the same in that all were adopt-
ed from the industry's standard CGL form policy. Id. at 1546 n.10.
111. Id. at 1545.
112. Id. at 1544.
113. Id. at 1549.
114. Id. at 1550.
115. The court explained:
[Tihe property damage here is distinct from the damage in asbestos bodi-
ly injury cases or toxic property damage cases such as Montrose, where
damage allegedly occurred upon first exposure to the DDT. In this case,
as in Fireman's Fund and Pines, property damage did not occur until the
plaster-pitting actually manifested, so the manifestation trigger ought to
determine which insurer's polices must afford coverage ....
Id. at 1551; see also Jackson v. Welco Mfg., 612 So. 2d 743, 744 (La. App. 1992)
(finding, similarly, that discoloration from defective sheetrock was merely aesthetic
damage meriting application of a discovery trigger).
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California Supreme Court would choose to apply the manifes-
tation trigger to third-party progressive loss claims as well.'16
Problems arise, however, in determining when the damage is
"manifest" in third-party situations when there is no close tem-
poral proximity between the third party's discovery of damage
and the insured's notice of loss."' If a new insurer comes on
the risk between discovery of the damage and the insured's no-
tice of liability, manifestation can be defined as either the third-
party's discovery of loss or the insured's notice of liability."'
Consequently, courts which adopt the manifestation trigger in
third-party situations must be prepared to explicitly identify the
"discovery" contemplated by the policy language."'
The Continuous Trigger
Eschewing the trend to apply the manifestation rule to third-
party "occurrence"-type policies, some courts have opted to base
coverage on the ongoing nature and continuous process of pro-
gressive property damage rather than looking to its observable
manifestation. 20 Using the continuous trigger theory, these
courts find coverage under all policies in effect from first expo-
sure to the injury causing condition through the manifestation of
116. Chemstar, 797 F. Supp. at 1550.
117. See infra notes 222-31 and accompanying text (discussing Great Southwest
Fire Insurance Co. v. Watt Industries, Inc., 280 Cal. Rptr. 249 (Ct. App. 1991)).
Similar problems in pinpointing "manifestation" can arise in the first-party context
as well. For example, an insured may know of property damage in one period but
not discover the cause of the loss until another. Some courts have held that man-
ifestation requires knowledge of the cause of the loss, not just knowledge of damage.
118. See infra notes 210-11 and 219-221 and accompanying text (discussing courts
which have held that manifestation occurs at the time insured is given notice); see
also infra notes 2212-18 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which manifes-
tation occurs at the third party's discovery).
119. To maintain coherence with the express language and general goals of third-
party policies, however, "manifestation" would need to be defined as the insured's
notice of liability. See infra notes 222-34 and accompanying text (discussing fortuity
in third-party scenarios).
120. See, e.g., Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 358 (Ct.
App.), review granted, 862 P.2d 661 (Cal. 1992); Great Southwest Fire Ins. Co. v.
Watt Indus., Inc., 280 Cal. Rptr. 249 (Ct. App. 1991); Harford County v. Harford
Mutual Ins. Co., 610 A.2d 286 (Md. 1992); Reliance Ins. Co. v. Armstrong World
Indus., Inc., 614 A.2d 642 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1992), modified, 625 A.2d 601
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1993).
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damage. In Gruol Construction Co. v. Insurance Co. of North
America, 2' the court applied a continuous trigger to find cov-
erage under all third-party policies that were on the risk as dry
rot damage progressed undetected for six years. 2 This trigger
involves a virtual "presumption" that damage in progressive
property loss situations occurs continuously in all policies from
the time of first exposure through the time of discovery.'23
In contrast to Chemstar, which adopted the manifestation
trigger for third-party losses, some courts have heeded
Prudential's limited holding and instead have applied the contin-
uous trigger to third-party claims.' For example, faced with a
claim over ongoing erosion and destruction of property in Stone-
wall Insurance Co. v. City of Palos Verdes Estates,125 a Califor-
nia court of appeal held that all insurers on the risk throughout
the period of damage were obligated to indemnify under a stan-
dard 1966 Comprehensive General Liability policy.2 6 In Stone-
wall, defective maintenance and construction of a city storm
121. 524 P.2d 427 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
122. Id. at 430. In Gruol, the insured constructed an apartment building in 1963.
Five years later, the purchaser sued the insured for dry rot damage caused by dirt
which was negligently piled against the building's box sills during construction. Id.
at 429. The court found that the dry rot constituted an "occurrence" during the
policy period and that the continuous nature of the damage required coverage under
both policies in effect as it progressed. Id. at 429-30.
123. In application, as in theory, the continuous trigger assumes that progressive
loss occurs as an ever-deteriorating continuum rather than in an intermittent fash-
ion. Property damage must actually be related to or result from a continuous process
to be considered continuous loss. For example, before allowing continuous trigger
liability, New Jersey law requires the insured to establish (1) that property damage
occurred during each policy period and (2) that damage was a part of a continuous
and indivisible process of injury. Chemical Leaman Tank Lines v. Aetna Casualty &
Sur. Ins. Co., 817 F. Supp. 1136, 1153-54 (D.N.J. 1993); see also Villella v. Public
Employees Mut. Ins. Co., 725 P.2d 957 (Wash. 1986).
124. Stonewall Ins. Co. v. City of Palos Verdes Estates, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 663, 672
(Ct. App.) (applying the concern and analysis of Prudential to find the continuous
trigger appropriate for third-party claims), review granted, 834 P.2d 1147 (Cal. 1992);
Montrose, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 365-67 (distinguishing Prudential because of the differ-
ences between first- and third-party coverage); Great Southwest Fire, 280 Cal. Rptr.
at 250 (finding that the Prudential decision suggested a different rule for third-party
cases).
125. 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 663 (Ct. App.), review granted, 934 P.2d 1147 (Cal. 1992).
126. Id. at 672. The courts analysis of the 1966 standardized policy should vary
little from the analysis of the revised 1973 standardized policy. Both policies are
substantially similar in all relevant portions, as discussed supra notes 47-53.
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drain "periodically and consistently" contributed to the erosion
and destruction of a third party's property.'27 Though it reject-
ed the manifestation rule, the court adopted the analytical
framework of the first-party policy decision in Prudential to
reach its holding.2 '
First, the court looked to the reasonable expectations of the
insured and found that the inclusion of "occurrence" and "contin-
uous exposure" in the liability policies would reasonably lead the
insured to expect coverage under all policies." 9 Next, the court
emphasized that the insurance industry was aware of these po-
tential ramifications of an "occurrence" based policy and had
established corresponding reserves."0 In so holding, the court
framed the definition of contingency in terms of the insured's
knowledge of liability: if the loss is unknown to the insured, it is
still contingent and insurable."'
In a similar case just prior to Stonewall, a separate division of
the same California appeals district also adopted the continuous
trigger. In Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Admiral Insurance
Co.,"'32 the court held that when "damage is continuous or pro-
gressive throughout successive policy periods, coverage is trig-
gered under the policies in effect for all periods." 3' Montrose
involved liability for property contamination resulting from the
insured's operation of a hazardous waste disposal facility."
The court noted that triggering coverage under a liability policy
127. Stonewall, 9 Cal. Rptr. at 670.
128. Id. at 673.
129. Id. at 672.
130. Id. at 672-73.
131. As the court explained,
the risk of the Papworth claim was contingent or unknown at least un-
til . . . Papworth filed his government claim against the city . . . . [As
stated in Prudential], 'Determining when appreciable damage occurs such
that a reasonable insured would be on notice of a potentially insured loss
is a factual matter for the trier of fact.' While enunciated in the context
of first-party/property damage insurance, this proposition appears equally
applicable to the question of contingency in third-party/liability insurance.
Id. at 678 (citation omitted); see infra notes 197-234 and accompanying text
(discussing the "loss-in-progress" doctrine) and notes 177-97 (discussing reasonable
expectations).
132. 5 Cal Rptr. 2d 358 (Ct. App. 1992).
133. Id. at 364.
134. Id. at 360.
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did not hinge on the timing of the cause or discovery of the inju-
ry, but rather focused solely on the damaging effect. 3 ' In ap-
plying this trigger, the court emphasized the distinctions be-
tween first- and third-party liability policies, differing public
policy concerns in disputes between insurers and those between
an insured and the insurer, and also the fundamental factual
differences encountered in continuous loss.'36
The Injury-in-Fact Trigger..7
Several courts have applied a more flexible and fact-specific
approach recognized as the "injury-in-fact" trigger.'38 Applica-
tion of this trigger requires protracted evidentiary proceedings
and tends to increase the expense of litigation, as the court must
ascertain when "in fact" injury occurred."9 Damage could be
found to have occurred at either discrete points in time or con-
tinuously over many years. As a result, coverage is not limited
to any particular point, such as manifestation, but is triggered
whenever damage can be proven to have occurred. Because of
135. Id. at 364.
136. The court set forth its reasoning as follows:
To begin with, some courts are oblivious to the distinction between first-
and third-party polices, applying rules developed under the language of
one indiscriminately to the other. Some courts fail to distinguish between
the rules of interpretation applicable to a dispute between insured and
insurer and those controlling a dispute between carriers to allocate a loss
already paid to the insured. The interpretation may also differ depending
upon whether the issue concerns coverage for bodily injury or property
damage or both, and depending upon whether the court is addressing a
single event resulting in immediate injury (an explosion), a single event
resulting in delayed or continuing injury (a chemical spill), or a continu-
ing event resulting in single or multiple injuries (exposure to asbestos or
toxic wastes).
Id. at 363-64 (citations and footnote omitted).
137. One court, when recently applying this trigger to property damage rather than
bodily injury claims, found the phrase "damage-in-fact" to be more appropriate.
Maryland Casualty Co. v. W.R. Grace & Co., No. 91-9322, 1993 WL 335115 (2d Cir.
Sept. 1, 1993).
138. American Home Prods. Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 748 F.2d 760, 764-65
(2d Cir. 1984); W.R. Grace & Co., 4 F.3d at 162; Dow Chem. Co. v. Associated
Indem. Corp., 724 F. Supp. 474, 478 (E.D. Mich.), supplemented, 727 F. Supp. 1524
(E.D. Mich. 1989); United States v. Conservation Chem., 653 F. Supp. 152 (W.D. Mo.
1986);
139. See Levin & Gorham, supra note 87, at 17.
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the technical difficulties in ascertaining when damage actually
occurs in long-term damage cases such as environmental con-
tamination, this trigger can be very difficult to apply with preci-
sion.'"
In Dow Chemical Co. v. Associated Indemnity Corp.,'4  a
Michigan District Court analyzed a series of product-related
property damage claims and concluded that the injury-in-fact
trigger was most appropriate.14 The Dow claims involved a de-
fective mortar additive that promoted the accumulation of rust
and eventually led to expansion and cracking.'43 The court
found that the language of the comprehensive general liability
policy at issue clearly supported the injury-in-fact trigger:
Absolutely nothing in the policy language suggests that an
event can trigger coverage prior to the time that the event
results in property damage. By the same token, nothing sug-
gests that exposure to conditions triggers coverage prior to
the time that property damage results from such exposure.
Moreover, the policy language does not even hint that prop-
erty damage must be known to anyone in order to trigger
coverage. Likewise, nothing in the policy language indicates
that property damage does not exist unless someone knows
about it.14
The court concluded that the only appropriate trigger is one that
corresponds to the factual record detailing the actual progression
of property damage. 45
Similarly, in Maryland Casualty Co. v. W.R. Grace & Co.,
46
the Second Circuit applied a "damage-in-fact" trigger to a third-
party dispute regarding property damage caused by the presence
and removal of asbestos. 47 To trigger coverage, the court stat-
ed that the insured must prove "the cause of the occurrence, the
result, and that the result occurred during the policy period." 48
140. See id. at 13-14.
141. 724 F. Supp. 474 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
142. Id. at 486.
143. Id. at 477.
144. Id. at 481.
145. Id. at 487.
146. No. 91-9322, 1993 WL 335115 (2d Cir. Sept. 1, 1993).
147. Id. at *6.
148. Id. at *12 (citing American Home Prods. Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 748
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When damage occurs in a continuum, multiple policies can cor-
respondingly be triggered, independent of discovery." Similar
to bodily injury precedent, the court held that "the [r]elevant
language in the insurance policies suppports a damage-in-fact
trigger for property damage claims." 50
REACHING AN APPROPRIATE RECONCILIATION FOR
THIRD-PARTY LOSSES
Theoretically, the trigger of coverage rules appear to create a
suitable guide for courts and lawyers involved with continuous
loss litigation. In reality, however, their existence adds very
little certainty in predicting how a particular court will hold. As
one judge has noted,
reference to trigger theories is more useful in describing what
has been decided than in determining what the decision
should be in a given case. The Court can discern no consis-
tent pattern in the myriad trigger cases that prescribes the
specific trigger theory to apply in a specific type of case.'
The array of holdings in third-party continuous loss cases,
however, are not necessarily irreconcilable. Analysis of third-
party holdings reveals distinct trends that can help clarify how
courts have reached their respective decisions. Such an analysis
is also crucial for determining the appropriate trigger for future
third-party continuous loss cases.
The Importance of Policy Interpretation
Because an insurance policy is, at its base level, a contract
between two parties, interpretation of the policy language must
be the first guide in resolution of continuous loss coverage is-
sues. Given the standardized nature of insurance policies, an
F.2d 760 (2d Cir. 1984)).
149. Id. at *11.
150. Id. at *6. The court in Grace was interpreting New York law, which has a
well developed body of continuous bodily injury case law adopting the injury-in-fact
trigger. See generally Abex Corp. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 790 F.2d 119 (D.C. Cir.
1986) (applying New York law); American Home Prods., 748 F.2d 760.
151. Dow Chem. Co. v. Associated Indem. Corp., 724 F. Supp. 474, 479 (E.D.
Mich.), supplemented, 727 F. Supp. 1524 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
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explanation for the wide disparity in third-party holdings would
seem elusive. However, the terms within third-party policies,
most notably "occurrence" and "property damage," lend them-
selves to a wide variety of interpretations.
Defining the "Occurrence"
Because a liability policy provides coverage only for occur-
rences during the policy period which result in property damage,
determining whether there has been an "occurrence" is of para-
mount importance.'52 Because an "occurrence" as defined in a
liability policy eventually must result in "property damage," in-
terpretation of these terms is highly interrelated and often virtu-
ally synonymous. 5' Even so, the policy requires only that an
occurrence, and not necessarily actual property damage, happen
during the policy period. Frequently, the result-oriented nature
of insurance litigation encourages courts to interpret the rele-
vant provisions in light of the equity considerations of the case
at bar rather than developing a consistent or predictable ap-
proach to continuous loss issues."' Independent evaluation of
these policy terms, however, can also result in an equitable
interpretation.
Courts adopting the continuous and injury-in-fact triggers
tend to tackle the interpretation of "occurrence" with a careful
emphasis on the wording and context of other relevant provi-
sions within the insurance policy. 5' Most frequently, these
152. For the language of the standard comprehensive general liability policy, see
supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
153. See Chemstar, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 797 F. Supp. 1541, 1547 n.11
(C.D. Cal. 1992). Disputes regarding the interpretation of "occurrence" also arise
when applying "per occurrence" policy limits to determine an insurer's total liability
after coverage is triggered. For a discussion of these issues, see Michael P. Sullivan,
Annotation, What Constitutes Single Accident or Occurrence Within Liability Policy
Limiting Insurer's Liability to a Specified Amount Per Accident or Occurrence?, 64
A.L.R.4th 668 (1988).
154. Standard Asbestos Mfg. & Insulating Co. v. Royal Indem. Co., No. CV-80-
14909, slip op. at 9 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Apr. 3, 1986); see, e.g., Dayton Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
National Gypsum Co., 682 F. Supp. 1403, 1409 (E.D. Tex. 1988), rev'd and dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction sub nom. W.R. Grace & Co. v. Continental Casualty Co., 896
F.2d 865 (8th Cir. 1990).
155. See, e.g., American Employer's Ins. Co. v. Pinkard Constr. Co., 806 P.2d 954,
955 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990).
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courts emphasize that the policy language does not contain any
requirements, implicit or explicit, that property damage be
"manifest" at any particular point in time in order to effectuate
a claim.'56 Rather, all that is required for an occurrence to trig-
ger coverage is that property damage occur within the policy
period. In Montrose, for example, the court stated that "[n]othing
about this language suggests a manifestation or discovery re-
quirement and nothing about it persuades that an expectation of
coverage for a continuing injury under successive policies is
unreasonable."'
In the absence of such a requirement, these courts conclude
that confining coverage to the insurer on the risk at manifesta-
tion would be an unjustified limitation of the liability policy.'58
Consequently, because progressive property loss, regardless of
whether it is manifest, occurs during multiple policy periods, a
continuous or injury-in-fact trigger theory is applicable.'59
In defining "occurrence" as actual injury within a policy period
and not simply the ultimate manifestation of damage, courts
that adopt injury-oriented triggers also note the availability of
"claims-made" liability policies. 6 ' "Claims-made," or "discov-
156. Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 358, 366 (Ct.
App.), review granted, 862 P.2d 661 (Cal. 1992); Great Southwest Fire Ins. Co. v.
Watt Indus., Inc., 280 Cal. Rptr. 249, 254 (Ct. App. 1991); Garriott Crop Dusting Co.
v. Superior Court, 270 Cal. Rptr. 678, 682-83 (Ct. App. 1990); Pinkard, 806 P.2d at
955-56; Harford County v. Harford Mut. Ins. Co., 610 A.2d 286, 294-95, (Md. 1992).
157. Montrose, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 366.
158. See infra notes 177-97 and accompanying text (discussing analysis of insurance
contract language by the courts).
159. The court in Harford, for instance, defended this outcome:
Nothing in the language of the policies, affording words their ordinary
and accepted meanings, requires that the, claimed property damage actu-
ally be discovered or manifested during the policy period; rather, it is
whether property damage, as defined in the policies, "occurred" within
the policy period and within the meaning of the word "occurrence" in the
policies.
Harford, 610 A.2d at 294. "Rather, coverage is provided if property damage occurs
during the policy period. Property damage here triggers coverage when actual dam-
ages are sustained." Pinkard, 806 P.2d at 955-56.
160. See, e.g., Montrose, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 367; Stanley v. Fire Ins. Exch., 274 Cal.
Rptr. 157, 161 (Ct. App. 1990) (distinguishing claims-made policies from policies cov-
ering losses that "happen" during the policy period); Pinkard, .806 P.2d at 955 (ap-
plying an injury-in-fact trigger to an action involving the continuous corrosion of a
roof instead of the more confined 'claims-made" policy).
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ery," policies are generally less expensive than the "occurrence"
based counterparts at issue in continuous loss litigation. A
claims-made policy indemnifies for only those liability claims
brought against the insured during the policy period. 6' Appli-
cation of the manifestation trigger to an "occurrence" based poli-
cy, many courts have reasoned, would unjustly transform it into
the cheaper, claims-made variety insurance policy by limiting
coverage to the insurer on the risk at the time of discovery. 1
62
In contrast, courts that adopt the manifestation trigger in the
third-party context construe the insured "occurrence" as synony-
mous with the manifestation or discovery of actual loss."
These holdings suggest that, unlike bodily injury claims, proper-
ty damage occurs only when it becomes appreciable and results
in loss of value.'" In addition, these cases note that the diffi-
culty in determining when damage begins and progresses can be
avoided through use of the manifestation trigger.'65 Courts
adopting this position cite to the longstanding holding of
Remmer v. Glens Falls Indemnity Co.'66 and the more recent
first-party manifestation holding in Prudential7  as support
161. 2 FREEDMAN, supra note 4, § 11:7.
162. "[Alpplication of the 'manifestation of loss' rule to a CGL 'occurrence' policy
would transform it into a 'claims made' policy." Montrose, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 367; see
also Stonewall Ins. Co. v. City of Palos Verdes Estates, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 663, 672-73
(Ct. App.) (rejecting a manifestation-based coverage for a "continuous trigger" to
avoid providing the insurance companies with a windfall), review granted, 834 P.2d
1147 (Cal. 1992). But see Jackson v. Welco Mfg., 612 So. 2d 743, 745 (La. Ct. App.
1992) (rejecting the argument that a manifestation trigger converts into a claims-
made policy).
163. See, e.g., Mraz v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 1325, 1328 (4th Cir.
1986) (determining in a claim for damage from hazardous waste leakage that occur-
rence takes place when injuries manifest themselves); American Home Ins. Co. v.
Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 786 F.2d 22, 31 (1st Cir. 1986); Bartholomew v. Ins. Co. of
N. Am., 502 F. Supp. 246, (D.R.I. 1980), affd sub nom. Bartholomew v. Appalachian
Ins. Co., 655 F.2d 27 (1st Cir. 1981); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Ameri-
can Ins. Co., 345 N.E.2d 267 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976); Pines of La Jolla Homeowners
Ass'n v. Industrial Indem., 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 53, 56 (Ct. App. 1992) (stating that an
occurrence is not necessarily when the wrong was committed, but when appreciable
loss is suffered).
164. See, e.g., Mraz, 804 F.2d at 1328; Pines of La Jolla, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 56.
165. Mraz, 804 F.2d at 1328 ("In [delayed discovery] cases we believe the better
rule is that the occurrence is deemed to take place when the injuries first manifest
theselves.").
166. 295 P.2d 19 (Cal. Ct. App. 1956).
167. Prudential-LMI Commercial Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 798 P.2d 1230 (Cal.
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for the proposition that coverage should be triggered when ap-
preciable damage occurs."
In Remmer, large quantities of rock and soil slid from the
plaintiffs land onto a neighbor's property several years after the
soil had been graded and filled."9 At issue was a comprehen-
sive personal liability policy in effect when the property was
filled but not at the time of the damage. 70 The California
Court of Appeals held that the covered occurrence transpired
when the soil actually slid, stating "[tihe general rule is that the
time of the occurrence of an accident within the meaning of an
indemnity policy is not the time the wroingful act was commit-
ted, but the time when the complaining party was actually dam-
aged."' 7' Reliance on the Remmer holding in continuous loss
litigation, however, is misplaced. On its face, Remmer stands for
no more than the proposition that an "occurrence" is defined not
as the time of the wrongful and ultmately injurious act, but
ratler whenever damage actually results. For example, when
damage is caused by a defectively constructed roof, the insured
"occurrence" is not the time of defective construction but at some
later point when damage results. Consequently, the holding in
Remmer supports the continuous trigger as well. Even so,
Remmer did not involve continuous and progressive loss, but
instead involved damage confined to a discrete and identifiable
incident. As a result, its fact-oriented equation of damage with
"manifestation" does not readily translate to progressive proper-
ty loss situations.7 2
1990).
168. See, e.g., Chemstar, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co, 797 F. Supp. 1541 (C.D. Cal.
1992); Pines of La Jolla, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 53; Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Aetna Casu-
alty & Sur. Co., 273 Cal. Rptr. 431 (Ct. App. 1990); Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Safeco
Ins. Co. of N. Am., 472 N.W.2d 5 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991).
169. Remmer, 295 P.2d at 19.
170. Id. The comprehensive personal liability policy in dispute was issued to the
plaintiffs in 1945. Id. at 20. The term "occurrence" was defined in the policy as "an
accident, or a continuous or repeated exposure to conditions, which results in injury
during the policy period, provided the injury is accidentally caused." Id.
171. Id. at 21; see also United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. American Ins. Co.,
345 N.E.2d 267, 270 (1976) (holding that the party insuring at the time the damage
becomes apparent is responsible for all of the injury, even if that party was not the
insurer when the wrongful act occurred).
172. See, e.g., California Union Ins. Co. v. Landmark Ins. Co., 193 Cal. Rptr. 461
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Application of the first-party manifestation holding in Pruden-
tial73 is also inapposite. Equating "property damage" in
third-party policies with the "inception of the loss" in first-party
policies negates the express differences in the terminology and
goals of each policy. As generally understood, "property damage"
is not limited in scope to the beginning or completion of a partic-
ular happening, but instead can encompass the entire progres-
sion or parts thereof.74 "Inception," however, clearly contem-
plates the commencement of a particular event.'75 Thus, "in-
ception" would need to be limited to some starting point relative
to the damage, such as the beginning of the damage itself or its
appreciable manifestation. Most importantly, in defining the "in-
ception of the loss" as the manifestation of damage in first-party
holdings, courts have made a policy choice to increase the likeli-
hood of an insured's recovery in spite of the twelve-month suit
limitations provision.7 ' Because third-party liability policies do
not contain a similar restriction or its attendant concerns, how-
ever, "property damage" should not be interpreted so narrowly.
Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations
When the policy language of an insurance contract is unclear,
it is well established that lingering ambiguity or uncertainty
should be resolved against the insurer and, where possible, in
accordance with the reasonable expectations of the insured.'
(Ct. App. 1983) (stating that Remmer was "inapposite" to the continuous loss case at
bar). It should be noted that the Remmer decision also predates the change in CGL
policy language from "accident" to "occurrence."
173. Prudential-LMI Commercial Ins. v. Superior Court, 798 P.2d 1230 (Cal. 1990).
174. Webster's Dictionary defines "occur" as "to be found or met with .. . to come
into existence: HAPPEN." WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 817 (9th
college ed. 1991). An "occurrence" is defined as "the action or instance of occurring."
Id.
175. Webster's Dictionary defines "inception" as "an act of process, or instance of
beginning: COMMENCEMENT." Id. at 608.
176. See, e.g., Prudential, 798 P.2d at 1246 (finding that, as between two first-party
insurers, the party on the risk when the damage first manifests itself must pay the
entire claim); see also infra notes 235-72 and accompanying text (discussing the role
of public policy).
177. Justification for this doctrine stems from the notion that insurance policies are
essentially adhesion contracts which result from a purported inequality in the bar-
gaining process. See 2 FREEDMAN, supra note 4, § 11:2; Harman v. American Casual-
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Consequently, a court's initial impression of the applicable policy
language can have a significant influence on the outcome of a
case. In continuous loss cases, courts that initially label the
policy terms as ambiguous when applied to progressive property
damage are more likely to apply the continuous trigger to find
broad coverage and advance the interests of the insured. 8 In
contrast, advocates of the manifestation trigger suggest that the
policy terms are clearly defined and easily applied. 7 9
In both Great Southwest Fire and Montrose, the courts respec-
tively defined the terms "property damage" and "occurrence" as
ambiguous. 8 ' Use of the reasonable expectations doctrine to
resolve these ambiguities led both courts to apply the continuous
injury trigger.'8 ' These courts noted that the "occurrence" ori-
ented nature of third-party policies makes it reasonable for the
insured to expect coverage under more than one policy for an
ongoing loss."5 2 In both cases, the courts emphasized that the
ty Co., 155 F. Supp. 612, 614 (S.D. Cal. 1957) (stating that the reasonable expecta-
tions doctrine is used to prevent insurers from taking advantage of insureds and to
prevent the weakening of policy purposes); Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Admiral Ins.
Co., 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 358 (Ct. App.), review granted, 862 P.2d 661 (Cal. 1992); see
also Stanley v. Fire Ins. Exch., 274 Cal. Rptr. 157, 160 (Ct. App. 1990) (applying
reasonable expectations doctrine to a first-party homeowner's policy); Mara v. Fire
Ins. Exch., 271 Cal. Rptr. 620, 622 (Ct. App. 1990) (applying this doctrine to a first-
party policy).
178. See infra notes 180-89 and accompanying text (discussing the influence of am-
biguous policy terms on contract interpretation); see, e.g., Montrose, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 366; Great Southwest Fire Ins. Co. v. Watt Indus., Inc., 280 Cal. Rptr. 249 (Ct.
App. 1991); Reliance Ins. Co. v. Armstrong World Indus., 614 A.2d 642 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law Div. 1992), modified, 625 A.2d 601 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1993);
Gottlieb v. Newark Ins. Co., 570 A.2d 443 (N.J. App. Div. 1990); Wisconsin Elec.
Power Co. v. California Union Ins. Co., 419 N.W.2d 255 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987).
179. Pines of La Jolia Homeowners Ass'n v. Industrial Indem., 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 53
(Ct. App. 1992); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 273 Cal.
Rptr. 431 (Ct. App. 1990).
180. Great Southwest Fire, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 253; Montrose, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 365
("The dozens of judicial definitions attributed to 'occurrence' leave little room for
argument about whether we are dealing with an ambiguity. "); Wisconsin Elec., 419
N.W.2d at 258 ("[W]ith this type of injury, there is considerable dispute as to when
the injury is deemed to occur. It is therefore our duty to determine what a reason-
able person in the position of the insured would have understood the words to
mean.").
181. Montrose, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 369; Great Southwest Fire, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 253-
54.
182. Appalachian Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 676 F.2d 56, 62 (3d Cir. 1982);
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only limitation in the language of the contract was that property
damage must occur during the policy period.' Because no
greater limitations existed, the courts concluded that it would
not be unreasonable for insureds to contemplate coverage under
multiple policies in cases of continuous damage."M
The court in Montrose went on to emphasize the distinctions
between first- and third-party policies and their effect on a rea-
sonable insured.'85 Unlike first-party insurance situations in
which an insured can predict his maximum potential loss, the
purchaser of a liability policy can only estimate the cost of po-
tential adverse claims. 8 ' The danger of inadequate coverage,
the court reasoned, added to an insured's expectation of coverage
under successive policies in progressive loss situations.' 7 Addi-
tionally, a twelve month limitation of suit provision, which
might prompt an insured to expect a discovery requirement,
does not exist in liability policies. 8 ' When considered with the
operative language of the policy, the court concluded, the expec-
tation of coverage under multiple policies was reasonable and
consistent with the application of a continuous trigger.
89
Harmonizing the continuous or injury-in-fact triggers with the
language of liability policies does not necessarily require that
such language be interpreted as ambiguous. 9 ' In fact, the
Montrose, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 358; Great Southwest Fire, 280 Cal. Rptr. 249.
183. Montrose, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 366; Great Southwest Fire, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 253.
Great Southwest Fire also looked to the two-prong definition of property damage to
find that insurers would have limited both prongs if such a limitation had been con-
templated. See supra text accompanying note 51 (providing the standard property
damage definition found in comprehensive general liability polices). The court in
Great Southwest Fire found that "if the first prong was similarly limited, there
would have been no need to include a special limitation applicable only to the sec-
ond prong." Great Southwest Fire, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 254.
184. Montrose, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 366-67; Great Southwest Fire, 280 Cal. Rptr. at
253.
185. Montrose, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 365-67.
186. Id. at 366.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 367.
189. Id. at 367-68.
190. See Maryland Casualty v. W.R. Grace & Co., No. 91-9322, 1993 WL 335115
(2d Cir. Sept. 1, 1993) (finding the term "occurrence" to be unambiguous and apply-
ing the injury-in-fact trigger to asbestos-related property damage); United States v.
Conservation Chem. Co., 653 F. Supp. 152, 196 (W.D. Mo. 1986) (finding the terms
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plain meaning of the relevant policy terms, independent of an
insured's reasonable expectations, demands the application of
injury-oriented triggers. As emphasized throughout this Note,
the policies clearly delineate that coverage is contingent on an
"occurence" resulting in "injury to or destruction of property"
within the policy period. Nothing else is required to happen
during the policy period for coverage to be triggered. Thus, pro-
gressive deterioration as typified by continuous loss is sufficient.
Nevertheless, courts that apply the manifestation trigger also
have found the policy language to be straightforward and unam-
biguous. For example, in Pines of La Jolla Homeowners Associa-
tion v. Industrial Indemnity,'9' the court found that the lan-
guage of the disputed policy was "clear."'92 Accordingly, the
court determined the policy only contemplated coverage of dam-
age which materialized during the policy period.' Some mani-
festation advocates in third-party situations have even applied a
deviation of the reasonable expectations doctrine when interpret-
ing the contract and have looked to the expectations of the in-
surer as well." 4 Because insurance policies are largely con-
tracts of adhesion, however, this approach undermines the goal
of guarding the "reasonable expectations" of the insured.'
Looking to the expectations of the insurer not only allows in-
unambiguous and applying the injury-in-fact trigger); Stonewall Ins. Co. v. City of
Palos Verdes Estates, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 663, 671 (Ct. App.), review granted, 834 P.2d
1147 (Cal. 1992); Harford County v. Harford Mut. Ins. Co., 610 A.2d 286, 287 (Md.
1992) (applying the terms of the insurance contract).
191. 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 53 (Ct. App. 1992)
192. Id. at 56; see also Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 273
Cal. Rptr. 431 (Ct. App. 1990).
193. Pines, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 57.
194. The court in Firemen's Fund, for instance, argued that industry interpretation
became especially relevant in disputes between insurers:
The general principal that ambiguities . . . must be interpreted in favor
of coverage is inapplicable where, as here, the case concerns only the
respective liabilities of two insurers ... . [Wihere two insurers dispute
the meaning of identical standard form policy language-the meaning
attached to the provisions by the insurance industry is, at minimum, rel-
evant.
Fireman's Fund, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 434-35 (citation omitted); see also Pines, 761 Cal.
Rptr. at 57.
195. See supra note 177 (discussing the justifications for the reasonable expecta-
tions doctrine).
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equality in the bargaining process but also transfers it to the
courtroom. Fortunately, this approach has been confined to in-
demnity actions between insurers."6 In these actions, courts
are ultimately more focused on the ramifications of their deci-
sion on the insurance industry rather than its indirect impact on
future insureds.'97
Because the insurance contract defines the indemnity rela-
tionship between the insured and the insurer, it must be the
primary focus of courts and litigants confronting progressive
property damage claims. Though the loss at issue is unique,
there is rarely anything unusual about the third-party insurance
contracts involved. As a result, courts should not abandon tradi-
tional tools of insurance contract interpretation such as the
reasonable expectations doctrine. In addition, the term "occur-
rence" and "property damage" must not be construed in ways
which hamper the established indemnity goals of third-party
insurance. Application of the manifestation trigger to liability
policies circumvents the insured's understanding of coverage and
forces artificial interpretations of the relevant policy terms. In
light of these considerations, well-reasoned judicial opinions
have adopted the continuous trigger.
The Loss-in-Progress Rule and Notions of Fortuity...
The concept of fortuity is a significant stumbling block for
many courts confronted with continuous loss claims. Because
insurance is designed to protect against risks of loss and not
certainties of loss, the fortuity doctrine was developed as a fun-
196. See, e.g., Fireman's Fund, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 434. "The general principle that
ambiguities in insurance contracts must be interpreted in favor of coverage is inap-
plicable where, as here, the case concerns only the respective liabilities of two insur-
ers." Id. (citation omitted).
197. See infra notes 235-72 and accompanying text (discussing public policy con-
siderations).
198. A complete discussion of the many facets of fortuity and the loss-in-progress
doctrine, even as it relates to progressive property damage, is beyond the scope of
this Note. For a general discussion of fortuity in progressive property loss situations,
see Antognini, supra note 40, at 419; Robert E. Reeder, Fortuity: The Unnamed
Exclusion and Environmental Claims Under First-Party Policy of Insurance, in
ENVIRONMENTAL CLAIMS AND PROPERTY INSURANCE COVERAGE 106 (A.B.A. Tort &
Ins. Proc. Sec. 1989).
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damental tenet of insurance law to determine whether an insur-
able contingency exists.'99 This limitation encourages the pur-
chase of insurance and promotes efficient risk allocation by pre-
venting the purchase of insurance only when known losses
arise."' In keeping with this policy, courts confronting continu-
ous loss cases must avoid forcing an insurer to indemnify a risk
which was no longer fortuitous when the policy was issued.
In first-party property insurance, the initial inquiry involves
whether the covered peril was a fortuitous event. In this context,
the "known loss" or 'loss-in-progress" doctrine prohibits coverage
of losses that were known to the insured at the time the insur-
ance policy was purchased.2"' Once a loss becomes known or
manifest to the insured, only the extent of damage, not the loss,
is uncertain:2 2 As a consequence, the peril is no longer fortu-
itous.
In third-party situations, the analogous concepts of "accident"
,and "fortuitous event" are employed.0 3 Liability policies insure
199. ROBERT E. KEETON, INSURANcE LAW § 1.3(a) (1988) (discussing risk).
A fortuitous and therefore insurable event . . . is dependent on chance. It
may be beyond the power of any human being to bring the event to
pass; it may be within the control of third persons; it may even be a
past event, as the loss of a vessel, provided that the fact is unknown to
the parties.
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 291 cmt. a (1932) (emphasis added). This was adopt-
ed with approval in Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee v. Insurance Co. of North
America, 724 F.2d 369, 371 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1105 (1982), and Great
Southwest Fire Insurance Co. v. Watt Industries, Inc., 280 Cal. Rptr. 249, 252 (Ct.
App. 1991).
200. There are several reasons the concept of fortuity has been adopted as a fun-
damental doctrine in insurance law. First, public policy concerns counsel against in-
suring certainties. Second, the insurance industry believes that allowing certainties
to be insured would encourage fraud and distort industry underwriting practices.
Lastly, insurance does not provide a warranty, but rather a contract for indemnity if
a risk occurs. See Reeder, supra note 198, at 108.
201. See, e.g., Bartholomew v. Appalachian Ins. Co., 655 F.2d 27, 28-29 (1st Cir.
1981); Prudential-LMI Commercial Ins. v. Superior Court, 798 P.2d 1230, 1244 n.7
(Cal. 1990); Chu v. Canadian Indem. Co., 274 Cal. Rptr. 20, 25 (Ct. App. 1990). For-
tuity issues also arise in determining whether a loss arises from reckless business
practices or purposeful conduct. See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 6, at 199-217; John J.
O'Leary, Jr., Current Trends in Comprehensive General Liability Insurance Coverage
for Environmental Claims: An Introduction to Some Key Coverage Issues, in ENVIRON-
MENTAL COVERAGE: FROM INTERPRETATION TO LITIGATION 104-08 (1990).
202. Chu, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 25.
203. Compagnie, 724 F.2d at 372.
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only those risks which are accidents or injurious exposures nei-
ther expected nor intended from the standpoint of the in-
sured.0 4 Damage which is an unexpected or unintended conse-
quence of the insured's conduct is a covered loss. When the dam-
age is either expected or intended by the insured,"°5 however,
there is no "occurrence" or "accident" and, correspondingly, no
coverage. As a result, third-party policies move the focus of for-
tuity from the risk nature of the insured peril to a subjective
investigation of the insured's actions and awareness of liability.
Clearly, application of the manifestation trigger to first-party
property loss cases harmonizes well with the loss-in-progress
rule. As in Prudential,"6 once the damage manifests itself to
the insured, the covered peril is no longer uncertain. Coverage of
related loss by later insurers would not be appropriate because
the peril is no longer contingent but certain."7 Only the extent
of damage and the amount of loss remain undetermined, if any-
thing. Terminating fortuity, and thus coverage, at a date earlier
than discovery would effectively eliminate indemnification for
progressive, delayed manifestation damage because of the twelve
month suit limitation provision.0 8
Courts which adopt the manifestation trigger in third-party
situations apply this construction of the loss-in-progress doctrine
as well. 9 In Fireman's Fund, for example, the court defined
the doctrine as prohibiting coverage "where the forces which
eventually lead to a loss were an immediate threat of loss when
the policy was issued."210 Thus, where the peril is manifest,
there is no longer an insurable contingency. More generally,
204. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text (quoting the relevant CGL policy
language).
205. See supra notes 48 and 50 and accompanying text (quoting applicable policy
language).
206. 798 P.2d 1230 (Cal. 1990).
207. Sabella v. Wisler, 377 P.2d 889 (Cal. 1963); Snapp v. State Farm Fire & Ca-
sualty Co., 24 Cal. Rptr. 44 (Ct. App. 1962).
208. See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text (discussing the preclusive effect
of the suit limitations provision).
209. Chemstar, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 797 F. Supp. 1541, 1551 (C.D. Cal.
1992); Pines of La Jolla Homeowners Ass'n v. Industrial Indem., 7 Cal. Rtpr. 2d 53,
57 (Ct. App. 1992); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 273 Cal.
Rptr. 431, 434 (Ct. App. 1990).
210. Fireman's Fund, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 432 n.2.
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these courts define fortuity in terms of actual damage, not the
insured's awareness of liability. If the damage has been discov-
ered, even by someone other than the insured, the loss is no
longer uncertain or fortuitous and any subsequent insurers are
relieved of responsibility.21'
In contrast, courts applying the continuous trigger to third-
party claims generally define fortuity in terms of the insured's
liability rather than actual damage.212 In Stonewall, the court
refuted Fireman's Fund's expression of contingency, stating "we
cannot conceive how a loss covered by third-party liability insur-
ance can be uninsurable when liability is unknown."21 Be-
cause such policies agree to pay those sums for which the in-
sured becomes legally obligated to pay, continuous trigger courts
reason, coverage is limited to unknown liabilities."4 In this
way, actual damage may no longer be fortuitous, but coverage is
still available when the insured's liability is still unknown and
therefore contingent.
Similarly, in Montrose the court read California's statutory
codification of fortuity to merely require some degree of contin-
gent liability.2 ' As a result, the court found that notification
from the Environmental Protection Agency that the plaintiff was
211. The court in Chemstar explained the relationship between the loss in progress
rule and the manifestation trigger as follows:
The loss in progress rule and the manifestation trigger complement one
another and protect the insured's access to insurance: To use the current
case as an example, even after plaster-pitting manifested in the first
home, subsequent insurers would be willing to issue policies to
Chemstar .... By contrast, the continuous injury trigger risks exposing
the insured to gaps in coverage: Once plaster pitting manifests in the
first home, a potential insurer that is aware of the heightened risk...
would be unwilling to issue policies to Chemstar ....
Chernstar, 797 F. Supp. at 1551. For a more detailed analysis of how courts empha-
size public policy considerations, see infra notes 226-61 and accompanying text.
212. See, e.g., Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 358 (Ct.
App.), review granted, 862 P.2d 661 (Cal. 1992).
213. Stonewall Ins. Co. v. City of Palos Verdes Estates, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 663, 677
(Ct. App.), review granted, 834 P.2d 1147 (Cal. 1992).
214. Stonewall, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 677; Montrose, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 371; Great
Southwest Fire Ins. Co. v. Watt Indus., Inc., 280 Cal. Rptr. 249, 252 (Ct. App.
1991); see also Sabella v. Wisler, 377 P.2d 889 (Cal. 1963) (showing focus should be
on insured's knowledge).
215. Montrose, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 370.
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a potentially responsible party for environmental contamination
was insufficient to remove contingency.216 However inevitable
an event might be, the court reasoned, an inevitable event is
still contingent if liability has not been firmly affixed to the in-
sured.217 In Montrose, the court stated that "[olur holding is
simply that where, as here, the insured is under no legal obliga-
tion to pay and no lawsuits were filed at the time the policies
were purchased, there is an insurable risk within the meaning
of [California Insurance Code] sections 22 and 250. "218 Thus,
these courts look to the larger goal of third-party policies as
protection for the insured against liability claims. If no known
liability exists at the time policy coverage begins, the risk is still
fortuitous and insurable regardless of any damage that may
have occured previously.
The court in Chemstar, which favored the manifestation trig-
ger, suggested that such a broad interpretation of fortuity com-
bined with the continuous trigger creates the risk of post-mani-
festation insurer liability.219 Its application, the court argued,
would force an insurer to be responsible for damage which previ-
ously manifested in another insurer's policy period simply be-
cause the insured's liability was uncertain when the policy was
purchased.2 0 Consequently, insureds would be exposed to cov-
erage gaps when insurers aware of the manifested loss and the
potential for future deterioration and liability claims would re-
fuse to issue policies. Such a concern, however, incorrectly
presupposes a complete abandonment of the concept of fortuity.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 371. California Insurance Code § 22 reads: "Insurance is a contract
whereby one undertakes to indemnify another against loss, damage, or liability aris-
ing from a contingent or unknown event." CAL. INS. CODE § 22 (West 1992). Section
250 reads: "Except as provided in this article, any contingent or unknown event,
whether past or future, which may damnify a person having an insurable interest,
or create a liability against him, may be insured against, subject to the provisions of
this code." Id. § 250.
219. Chemstar, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 797 F. Supp. 1541, 1551 (C.D. Cal.
1992).
220. Id.
221. Id.
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This perceived threat of post-manifestation insurer liability
resulting from application of a continuous trigger was confronted
successfully in the case of Great Southwest Fire Insurance Co. v.
Watt Industries.222 In Great Southwest Fire, the issue involved
whether an insurer was liable for damages that resulted from a
continuous loss that had manifested itself to a third-party home-
owner during a previous insurer's period but which had only
manifested itself, through the inception of legal action, to the
insured some months later.223 In this case, the court confronted
the highly probable scenario of manifestation to the injured
party long before the loss is known to the insured.224 Similar to
Stonewall and Montrose, the majority in Great Southwest Fire
avoided the threat of coverage gaps by applying fortuity in rela-
tion to the insured's, not the injured third party's,
knowledge.2" Because property damage occurred during both
policy periods but was unknown to the insured during this time,
the loss was still fortuitous and insurable by both insurers.226
Consequently, the continuous trigger was appropriate because
coverage was not precluded by a certainty of liability.227 In this
way, the court avoided holding a "post-manifestation" insurer
222. 280 Cal. Rptr. 249 (Ct. App. 1991). In this case, the insurance policy con-
tained a "completed operations" provision. This provision stipulated that "[tihe com-
pany will pay . .. all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated [which
are] included in the completed operations hazard. ... " Id. at 251 n.1. Completed
operations include "property damage arising out of operations or reliance upon a
representation or warranty.. . ." Id. The court did not distinguish the policy from
a standard CGL as a result of this provision, however. Id. at 251-56. Instead, it
relied on the definition of "occurrence" as provided in the standard CGL definitions
section. Id. at 258.
223. Id. at 252.
224. The court commented on the issues implicated in the case before it:
The issues in this case concern the availability and extent of liability
insurance coverage for progressive damage which is first manifest before
the policy period but which continues during the policy period. The issues
arise because of the unique context of third-party liability insurance cre-
ates the likelihood that damage will be manifest (i.e. observable to the
injured party) long before it is known to the insured or the insurer.
Id. (emphasis added).
225. Id. at 252-53.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 255.
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liable for a known loss, as advocates of the manifestation trigger
fear.
The dissent in Great Southwest Fire, however, supported ap-
plication of the manifestation rule and argued that the majority
did not interpret "occurs" properly with respect to "occur-
rence."228 Properly interpreted, the dissent argued, the insured
loss was the damage that had previously manifested itself to a
third party.229 Therefore, the risk was no longer contingent
when the subsequent policy was purchased regardless of the
insured's ignorance of liability."' Thus, the dissent avoided the
threat of post-discovery insurer liability by interpreting loss as
the manifestation of damage to the injured party, rather than
with respect to the insured's knowledge.23'
The problems that proponents of the manifestation trigger
foresee are misplaced. As the outcome in Great Southwest Fire
demonstrated, the continuous trigger does not promote coverage
gaps or violate the fortuity doctrine. It is well established in
insurance law that once the responsible insurers are determined
for a particular loss, future insurers are relieved of responsibili-
ty for that loss:232
Once the contingent event insured against has occurred dur-
ing the period covered, the liability of the carrier becomes
contractual rather than potential only, and the sole issue re-
maining is the extent of its obligation, and it is immaterial
that this may not be fully ascertained at the end of the policy
period.3
228. Id. at 258 (Huffman, J., dissenting).
229. Id.
230. The dissent argued:
[Olne cannot usefully discuss when a loss "occurs" for coverage purposes
without acknowledging some beginning and potential ending point of the
loss . .. . Here, the loss started and was discoverable by the home-
owners' association . .. under the Remmer test some three months before
[insured's] policy period began. It was then a manifested loss.
Id. at 258 (citation omitted).
231. Id.
232. Harman v. American Casualty Co., 155 F. Supp. 612, 614 (S.D. Cal. 1957);
Sabella v. Wisler, 377 P.2d 889 (Cal. 1963); Home Ins. Co. v. Landmark Ins. Co.,
253 Cal. Rptr. 277, 280-81 (Ct. App. 1988); Snapp v. State Farm Fire & Casualty
Co., 24 Cal. Rptr. 44 (Ct. App. 1962).
233. Snapp, 24 Cal. Rptr. at 46 (citations omitted).
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Consequently, policies triggered by an insured's liability are re-
sponsible for all related damage, even progressive deterioration
which occurs in the future under other carriers. The fortuity doc-
trine is in full force as it terminates responsibility of future in-
surers for the liability once it becomes known to the insured.
As demonstrated, the concept of fortuity should be defined in
relation to the policy which insures the risk. The continuous
trigger can only be conceptualized as violating the fortuity doc-
trine when the trigger mechanism is misidentified as the mani-
festation of damage rather than the insured's knowledge of lia-
bility. Comprehensive General Liability policies do not insure
damage as such; rather they insure a party's potential liability
for damage or loss. Thus, defining a known loss in relation to a
third party's knowledge of loss rather than the insured's knowl-
edge of liability divorces the implementation of the policy from
its goals and express policy language. Liability insurance may
involve three parties, but only the insured and the insurer are
parties to the contract. When property damage occurs over suc-
cessive policy periods, triggering all policies on the risk through
the insured's actual notice of liability is appropriate and does
not violate the fortuity doctrine.
Consequently, the manifestation trigger should be limited to
first-party progressive loss situations such as in Prudential."4
First-party policies undertake to protect the insured from the
risk of property damage within the policy period. Unlike liability
insurance, the limitation of suit provision in first-party policies
has forced courts to define fortuity in a manner that maximizes
coverage. In addition, it is appropriate to define the known loss
in terms of manifested damage because there is no intermediary
party involved. A first-party insured would be expected to know
of damage, whereas a third-party insured may not.
Public Policy Considerations
Ultimately, the trigger a particular court adopts reflects that
court's considered or implied view toward the role of law in
shaping insurance policy. Because the insurance industry is at
234. Prudential-LMI Commercial Ins. v. Superior Court, 798 P.2d 1230 (Cal. 1990).
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once a political, regulatory, and cultural phenomenon," 5 public
policy concerns are difficult to avoid. The cases illustrate that
courts applying the manifestation trigger champion public policy
as necessitating the creation of consistent, bright line rules to
promote insurance industry interests and indirectly benefit
insureds. 36 In contrast, continuous trigger proponents tend to
interpret a policy's contractual language in light of public policy
considerations such as the reasonable expectations of the in-
sured, advancing the plain language of the policies and the con-
sideration of injured third parties.237 Public policy, however,
should not overshadow the implementation of the express con-
tractual provisions that outline the established indemnity rela-
tionship of the insurance policy.
The parties to the litigation are a primary influence on the
direction a court will take in analyzing public policy. Indemnity
and subrogation actions between insurers tend to produce opin-
ions concerned with potential insurance industry ramifica-
tions. 3 ' In contrast, actions by an insured or injured third par-
ty against an insurer generally encourage greater emphasis on
adequately compensating the claimant.239 Judicial efforts to
preserve a right of action by the insured or to compensate in-
nocent third-party beneficiaries have frequently played a domi-
nant role in the adoption of a particular trigger in individual
cases.
240
235. See, e.g., Richard D. Barger & Eugene E. Miller, "Speaking with One Voice":
Constitutional Failure of State Insurance Government Ownership Statutes, 26 U.S.F.
L. REV. 657 (1992); Benjamin Schatz, The AIDS Insurance Crisis: Underwriting or
Overreaching?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1782 (1987); Anne C. Cicero, Note, Strategies for
the Elimination of Sex Discrimination in Private Insurance, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 211 (1985); Christopher Keele, Note, State Insurance Takeover Acts: A Constitu-
tional Analysis After Edgar v. Mite, 59 IND. L.J. 255 (1983/1984).
236. Chemstar, 797 F. Supp. at 1551; Prudential, 798 P.2d at 1246-47; Home Ins.
Co. v. Landmark Ins. Co., 253 Cal. Rptr. 277, 282 (Ct. App. 1988); United States
Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. American Ins. Co., 345 N.E.2d 267, 272 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976).
237. Stonewall Ins. Co. v. City of Palos Verdes Estates, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 663, 672,
677 (Ct. App.), review granted, 834 P.2d 1147 (Cal. 1992); Montrose Chem. Corp. v.
Admiral Ins. Co., 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 358, 365-66 (Ct. App.), review granted, 862 P.2d
661 (Cal. 1992); Great Southwest Fire Ins. Co. v. Watt Indus., Inc., 280 Cal. Rptr.
2d 249, 256 (Ct. App. 1991); Harford, 610 A.2d at 295.
238. Pines, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 60; Fireman's Fund, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 435.
239. Great Southwest Fire, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 249.
240. See, e.g., Dayton Indep. Sch. Dist. v. National Gypsum Co., 682 F. Supp. 1403
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In Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety
Co.,"4 a third-party liability dispute, the court determined that
the nature of the action was particularly important and used it
to justify its heavy reliance on a first-party continuous loss
case. 2 Confronted with a coverage dispute between insurers,
the court in Fireman's Fund found that "cases which interpret
similar policy language in a dispute between the insured and
the insurer are distinguishable." 3 The court explained that
this distinction was critical because actions between insurers al-
low the courts to adopt rules based more on public policy consid-
erations than the policy language itself.' In addition, courts
did not need to be concerned with the compensation of innocent
third parties when remedying insurer-only disputes." 5
Without these compensation concerns, these courts look pri-
marily to the impact of their holding on the future conduct of
the insurance industry. In Fireman's Fund46 and Pines of La
Jolla Homeowners Association v. Industrial Indemnity,' the
courts noted that the industry understanding of an "occurrence"
policy was "to anchor all losses in the one policy in effect at the
onset of the condition rather than apportion [the loss] over sev-
eral policies."24 Unlike cases involving insureds, the reason-
(E.D. Tex. 1988) (observing that judicial desires to maximize coverage influence trig-
ger decisions), rev'd and dismissed for lack of jurisdiction sub nom. W.R. Grace &
Co. v. Continental Casualty Co., 896 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1990); Lac d'Amiante du
Que., Ltee., v. American Home Assurance Co., 613 F. Supp. 1549, 1551 (D.N.J. 1985)
(noting the desire of some courts to .maximize an insured's coverage); Mara v. Fire
Ins. Exch., 271 Cal. Rptr. 620, 622 (Ct. App. 1990) (stating that some courts decide
triggers almost without reference to the policy language).
241. 273 Cal. Rptr. 431 (Ct. App. 1990).
242. Id. at 434.
243. Id. at 435.
244. "That fact is the critical one because it permitted the court to adopt a rule
based more upon public policy considerations; there was no need to focus on the
insurance policy language interpreted in light of the insured's reasonable expectation
of coverage." Id. at 434 (citation omitted).
245. Id.
246. 273 Cal. Rptr. 431 (Ct. App. 1990).
247. 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 53 (Ct. App. 1992).
248. Pines, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 57.
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able expectations doctrine 9 of interpreting ambiguities in fa-
vor of the insured was deemed inapplicable.25
Some courts adopting the manifestation rule in both first- and
third-party situations, however, do not overlook the insured's
interests completely but instead approach them indirectly.25'
These courts suggest that the rule provides greater certainty to
insurers in an industry that demands stability.252 Application
of the manifestation trigger, they argue, grants insurers the
ability to estimate risks more accurately, thus allowing the tech-
nical subsystem of insurance to function most effectively. 3 For
example, in Prudential" the court hoped to promote the inter-
ests of both the insurer and the insured by adopting the mani-
festation trigger, stating that such a rule
promotes certainty in the insurance industry and allows
insurers to gauge premiums with greater accuracy. Presum-
ably this should reduce costs for consumers because insurers
will be able to set aside proper reserves for well-defined
coverages and avoid increasing such reserves to cover poten-
tial financial losses caused by uncertainty in the definition of
coverage. 5
Because of this certainty and the knowledge that insurers no
longer on the risk will be free from liability for losses long after
their policies have expired, advocates of the manifestation trig-
ger assert that the insureds' interests will be furthered by
strengthening public access to liability insurance.256
249. See supra notes 177-97 and accompanying text (discussing the reasonable ex-
pectations doctrine and policy interpretation).
250. "The general principle that ambiguities in insurance contracts must be inter-
preted in favor of coverage is inapplicable where, as here, the case concerns only the
respective liabilities of two insurers." Fireman's Fund, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 435 (citation
omitted; see also Pines, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 57 (applying the industry understanding
of the policy language and adopting the reasoning of Fireman's Fund).
251. Carty v. American States Ins. Co., 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1, 4-5 (Ct. App. 1992); Pru-
dential-LMI Commercial Ins. v. Superior Court, 798 P.2d 1230 (Cal. 1990).
252. Carty, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 4-5.
253. Id.
254. Prudential, 798 P.2d 1230.
255. Id. at 1246 (quoting Home Ins. Co. v. Landmark Ins. Co., 253 Cal. Rptr. 277,
282 (Ct. App. 1988)).
256. See, e.g., Chemstar, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 797 F. Supp. 1541, 1551
(C.D. Cal. 1992).
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In contrast, the use of the continuous trigger of coverage is
more prevalent in actions between the insured and the insurer
in which an innocent third party or the insured merit compensa-
tion.25 Unlike first-party insurance where policies are pur-
chased solely for the benefit of the insured, inadequate liability
coverage exposes third parties to loss as well. Because of the
nature of continuous property damage claims, these losses could
be quite large."8 As a result, coverage under multiple policies
avoids the constraints of individual policy limits and generally
facilitates adequate compensation.
Opponents of the continuous trigger argue that its use exposes
insurers to unpredictable risks, endless liability and depleted re-
serves. 9 Such concerns do have merit. Continuous trigger ad-
vocates find support for their holdings in insurance industry
commentary on the 1966 and 1973 revisions of the standard
Comprehensive General Liability policy, which recognizes poten-
tial multi-policy liability for continuous losses.26 In Stonewall,
the court even recognized the unpredictability for insurers that
accompanies such liability.' The court reasoned, however,
that the issue regarded a choice between whether the insured or
the insurers should bear the cost of the unexpected liability. 62
Without hesitation, the court found that the question should be
resolved in favor of the insureds and their reasonable expecta-
tions of coverage after paying premiums to transfer their
risk.26
3
257. Stonewall Ins. Co. v. City of Palos Verdes Estates, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 663 (Ct.
App.), review granted, 834 P.2d 1147 (Cal. 1992); Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Admiral
Ins. Co., 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 358 (Ct. App.), review granted, 862 P.2d 661 (Cal. 1992);
Great Southwest Fire Ins. Co. v. Watt Indus., Inc., 280 Cal. Rptr. 249 (Ct. App.
1991); American Employer's Ins. Co. v. Pinkard Constr. Co., 806 P.2d 954 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1990); Harford County v. Harford Mut. Ins. Co., 610 A.2d 286 (Md. 1992).
258. See supra notes 120-36 (detailing recent verdicts and claims in continuous loss
cases).
259. Chemstar, 797 F. Supp. at 1551; see also Prudential, 798 P.2d at 1246-47 (ad-
vocating the use of the manifestation rule in first party progressive property loss
cases).
260. See, e.g., Stonewall, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 672-73. Of course, manifestation advo-
cates also are able to find supporting commentary from the period of the revisions.
261. Id. at 672.
262. Stonewall, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 673.
263. Id.
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Clearly, the impact of continuous loss holdings on the insur-
ance industry and their subsequent ramifications on the future
availability of insurance are of great significance and cannot be
ignored. Because of the upsurge in legal liability for continuous
losses, their unpredictable nature and lengthy gestation, and the
ever-present effects of inflation, an insurer's ability to accurately
gauge liability premiums is made difficult. In response, courts
have been motivated to use the manifestation trigger to assist
insurers in minimizing their losses from inadequately priced
premiums and dwindling reserves.2" However, this response
releases insurers from their contractual duties as a result of
their own negligence. In addition, adoption of a manifestation
trigger does not necessarily increase access to insurance or guar-
antee industry stability.
Premiums paid under current liability policies are determined
in accordance with the expected losses of the insured.2" These
premiums are not only designed to reflect the level of perceived
risk but also to achieve an efficient allocation between loss pre-
vention and risk distribution through the purchase of insur-
ance.2"' As a consequence, excessive concentration on the equi-
264. Of course, across-the-board adoption of the manifestation trigger would not
necessarily reduce an insurer's overall liability for continuous loss claims. Were the
continuous or injury-in-fact triggers to be universally adopted, more insurers would
bear the burden of indemnifying insureds. Depending on how an insured's claim was
apportioned among insurers, a particular insurer might only be liable for a
percentage of the total cost representing only a portion of its maximum policy liabili-
ty. Issues of apportionment among successive insurers, however, is beyond the scope
of this Note. Cases which have discussed apportionment include: Chemical Leaman
Tank Lines v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Ins. Co., 817 F. Supp. 1136, 1153 (D.N.J.
1993) (adopting joint and several liability); Northern States Power Co. v. Fidelity &
Cas. Co., 504 N.W.2d 240 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993); J.H. France Refractories Co. v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 626 A.2d 502, 508 (Pa. 1993) (holding that each triggered policy
bears potential liability for entire claim); Gruol Constr. Inc. v. Insurance Co. of N.
Am., 524 P.2d 427, 431 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (placing burden of apportionment on
insurers).
265. KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK 2 (1986). In its simplest form, risk
is determined by multiplying the probability of a loss by the magnitude of the loss
if it occurs. Id. The risk is then distributed from the individual to the insurance
company. The insurance company then manages the risk by distributing it among
large numbers of individuals or businesses through the insurance of different classes
of insureds. Id. at 1-2.
266. Id. at 12. Accurate premium gauging not only insures efficient distribution of
risk but provides incentives for insureds to take risk prevention measures other than
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table distribution of losses in the present ignores future implica-
tions and ultimately hinders efficient risk allocation.267 As re-
flected in the policies and insurance industry commentary, the
1966 and 1973 Comprehensive General Liability policy revisions
contemplated potential coverage of continuous loss under multi-
ple policy periods. In response, premiums were fixed to re-
flect the perceived risk. 69 The availability of "claims-made"
policies especially underscores this endeavor and the broader
spectrum of risk incorporated into occurrence policy premiums.
Applying the manifestation trigger to comprehensive general
liability policies conveys misinformation to both the insureds
and insurers. It effectively transforms the "occurrence" policy
contracted for into a "claims-made" policy by limiting coverage to
the insurer on the risk when damage is discovered. Occurrence
policies attempt to predict the future costs of present activities,
regardless of when liability attaches. In contrast, a claims-made
policy only predicts an insured's liability in the policy period
from activities in the past.7' Consequently, an individual pur-
chasing claims-made coverage will feel only the effects, through
premium rates, of past activities. Therefore, the incentive to
minimize the potential costs of risky activities through loss pre-
vention measures is reduced.' In contrast, occurrence policy
premiums reflect the future risks and costs of present activities.
In response, an insured will be inspired to reduce total costs by
insurance. Id. High premiums dissuade individuals from investing in insurance,
while low premiums encourage excessive purchase of insurance and neglect of other
possible risk reducing measures. Id. For example, low fire insurance premiums might
encourage an individual to spend money on extra insurance rather than fire extin-
guishers, alarm systems and fire prevention measures. Id.
267. Id. "This is because any decision to distribute a loss when such distribution is
not the result of an already determined risk allocation both disturbs a previous allo-
cation and creates new incentives on the part of similarly situated insureds." Id.
268. See supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text (discussing the evolution of rele-
vant CGL policy provisions).
269. See, e.g., Stonewall Ins. Co. v. City of Palos Verdes Estates, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d
663, 673 (Ct. App.), review granted, 834 P.2d 1147 (Cal. 1992); Montrose Chem.
Corp. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 358, 367-68 (Ct. App.), review granted,
862 P.2d 661 (Cal. 1992).
270. ABRAHMI, supra note 265, at 50.
271. Id.
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pursuing an optimum balance of insurance and loss prevention
measures. 
272
The effects of applying the manifestation trigger to liability
policies mirror those of claims-made policies. Prevention of fu-
ture risks is discouraged as only the effects of past activities are
felt by the insured as a result of policy application. The fact that
disincentives for loss prevention are created through judicial
intervention with occurrence policies, rather than the affirma-
tive purchase of claims-made policies, makes the effects even
more insidious. When combined with the inconsistent applica-
tion of trigger theories, neither the insured nor the insurers can
predict their insurance needs. Insurers cannot accurately gauge
premiums because of the uncertainty as to whether they are
insuring risks through true occurrence coverage or judicially
imposed claims-made policies. In response, individuals will find
themselves paying exorbitant premiums, unable to obtain in-
surance, or underinsured if courts apply the manifestation trig-
ger to relieve insurer indemnity burdens arising from poor un-
derwriting practices. Consistent application of the continuous
trigger, in accordande, with established underwriting practices
and policy language, however, can avoid these harmful conse-
quences in the future.
CONCLUSION
The California Supreme Court's decision in Prudential273 re-
solved many questions involving the trigger of coverage in first-
party progressive loss cases. In these situations, the court appro-
priately concluded that only the insurer on the risk at the time
of "manifestation" is responsible for indemnifying the in-
sured.274 Unfortunately, coverage in third-party loss situations
still suffers from inconsistent and poorly reasoned holdings.
In an attempt to clarify and bring a measure of predictability
to third-party progressive loss litigation, some courts have re-
cently elected to apply the manifestation trigger to liability
272. Id. at 51.
273. Prudential-LMI Commercial Ins. v. Superior Court, 798 P.2d 1230 (Cal. 1990).
274. Id. at 1246-47.
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claims as well. 5 Such action, however, negates the express
contractual differences between first- and third-party policies
and overlooks the important and distinct policy goals of each.
The manifestation trigger is not a touchstone for all progressive
loss scenarios.
Courts confronted with third-party continuous loss claims
should first examine the contractual provisions which govern the
indemnity relationship at issue. Public policy concerns, insur-
ance industry ramifications, and the future availability of cover-
age should be secondary to the terms of the insuring contract.
Objective interpretation of comprehensive general liability poli-
cies reveals that "an occurrence" resulting in property damage
within the policy period is the designated trigger of coverage. No
other restrictions are contemplated and therefore should not be
read into the relationship. Consequently, in third-party continu-
ous loss situations, the continuous trigger most effectively mir-
rors the coverage intended by these polices.
Application of the continuous trigger does not necessarily
thwart the certainty that is such a cherished component of the
manifestation trigger. Insurers carrying the burden of indemnity
can still be easily ascertained when litigation arises. Litigants
will be assured that the contractual provisions of the indemnity
relationship, and not the public policy whims of the court, will
govern the outcome of their cases. Consistent application may
also prevent needless litigation by generating certainty of re-
sults. In addition, the insurance industry will have a reliable
and predictable trigger with which to calculate their premiums
and estimate their necessary reserves.
The follies of excessive underwriting in earlier decades and
heavy insurer burdens should not tempt courts to drift from
their role as the ultimate interpreters of the insurance contract.
Manipulating the future of insurance coverage through policy
rewriting is a job for the insurance industry and its experts, not
the courts.
Chandra Lantz
275. See supra note 109.
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